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both give pertinent data in the form of facts, figures, 
arguments, and alternatives. 
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To Members of the Forty-seventh Colorado General As-
sembly: 
In accordance with provisions of House Joint 
Resolution No. 1026 0 1968 regular session, the Legis-
lative Council undertook a study relating to the sub-
ject of public employee negotiations in Colorado. 
The report and recommendations of the committee 
appointed to carry out this study was adopted by the 
Legislative Council, without recommendation, at its 
December 9, 1968 meeting for transmission to the mem-
bers of the first regular session of the Forty-seventh 
Colorado General Assembly~ 
CPL/mp 
Respectfully submit~ed, 
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Representative C. P. Lamb, Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
Room 46, State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
MEMBERS 
LT. GOV. MARK HOCIAN 
SEN. P'AY DIEBERARD 
SEN, FRANK KEMP 
SEN, VINCENT MASSARI 
SEN, RUTH STOCKTON 
SPEAKER JOHN D, 
VANDERHOOI" 
REP, BEN KLEIN 
REP, RAY BLACK 
REP,JOSEPHCALABRESE 
REP, CARL GUSTAFSON 
REP. RAYMOND WILDER 
In accordance with the provisions of House Joint Resolu-
tion No. 1026, your Committee on Public Employee Negotiations 
was appointed to study procedures to be established by law for 
public employee negotiations; at the same time, the committee 
was directed to consider the maintenance and continuity of gov-
ernmental services vital to the public interests. The committee 
has completed its work and submits the accompanying report and 
recommendations. 
The committee has agreed to &ubmit one bill which estab-
lishes procedures for public employee negotiations, and main-
tains governmental services vital to the public interest. 
BK/pw 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Representative Ben Klein 
Chairman 




The Legislative Council Committee on Public Employee Ne-
gotiations was created pursuant to the provisions of House Joint 
Resolution No. 1026, 1968 regular session 0 to study methods of 
establishing public employee negotiations and, at the same time, 
assure the maintenance of governmental services vital to the pub-
lic interests~ The members appointed to the committee were: 
Rep. Ben Klein, Chairman 
Sen. Allegra Saunders, 
Vice Chairman 
Sen. William S. Garnsey, III 
Sen. Frank Lo Gill 
Sen. Frank Kemp, Jr. 
Sen. Floyd Oliver 
Rep. James Braden 
Rep. Don Friedman 
Rep~ Wayne Knox 
Repo C. P. Lamb 
Rep& Paul E. Morris 
At the committee's first meeting, the committee members 
decided to conduct hearings and invite interested persons, both 
employers and employees, from the various governmental units. 
After the completion of the hearings, the committee agreed that 
attempts should be made in formulating legislation. The remain-
der of the committee meetings were devoted to drafting a bill 
permitting public employee negotiations, 
The committee wishes to express its appreciation to the 
numerous governmental employees and employers who took time to 
speak before the committee on the various issues of public em-
ployee negotiations. 
Stanley Elofson, senior research analyst, and Ed Isern, 
senior research assistant, on the Leg~slative Council staff, had 
the primary responsibility for the staff work on the study. 
Eugene Cavaliere~ staff attorney of the Legislative Drafting Of-
fice, had the primary responsibility for bill drafting services 
provided the committeee 
December 10, 1968 
vii 
Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
By action of the second regular session of the Forty-sixth 
General Assembly, the Legislative Council was directed to appoint 
a committee to study public employee negotiations. The Council 
was directed, under House Joint Resolution No. 1026, to report to 
the first regular session of the Forty-seventh General Assembly 
on: 
A study on procedures that should be 
established by law relating to the manner in 
which employees of the state or any of its 
political subdivisions should represent them-
selves in negotiations with their respective 
employers; the establishment of the legal 
relationship between the state and its poli-
tical subdivisions and the public employees 
and their representatives, particularly in 
regard to establishing a framework by which 
negotiation procedures between public em-
ployees and their employers should be conduc-
ted. This study shall include consideration 
of the maintenance and continuity of govern-
mental services vital to the public interest. 
Committee Procedures 
In its study of the advisability of recommending state 
legislation on public employee negotiations, the committee first 
held a series of hearings with conferees interested in the prob-
lems of public employee negotiations and its many related issues. 
Four committee meetings were devoted to these hearings and sever-
al additional sessions were spent in preparing the bill which the 
committee recommends. At the first hearing, the committee was 
given an overview of public employee negotiations in Colorado and 
other states; at the second meeting, negotiations in public edu-
cation was the primary topic; at the third hearing attention was 
devoted to negotiations on the local government level and to 
negotiations with college and university personnel; and at the 
final hearing public employee negotiations with state government 
was the primary topic. 
In addition to the hearings, members of the committee at-
tended conferences in Denver and in Boulder at which a number of 
nationally recognized individuals in the field of public employee 
negotiations were the principle speakers. The annual meeting of 
the Education Commission of the States was held in Denver using 
the topic "Teacher Militancy - Strikes, Sanctions, and State 
Government.'' The second conference, sponsored by the Center for 
Labor Education and Research at the University of Colorado, dis-
cussed collective negotiations in all phases of public employment. 
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Following the hearing.s: and the conferences, the committe.E!-
discussed the information and recommendations presented to the 
committee. The maJority of the members con.eluded that an attempt 
would be. made to prepare legislation to enable the state and it!i 
political subdivisions to conduct negotiations with their respec-
tive emp.loyees. The remaining committee meetings were devoted to 
discussion and revision of draft legislation. 
Over 40 persons prepared statements or appeared before the 
committee in the committee's hearings. (Appendix A, on pages 39-
41 provides a list of these conferees .• ) These conferees. repre-
sented positions of public employers as well as the public em-
ployees of state government, cities and other local government, 
primary and secondary education, and higher education. Confer-
ees with academic backgrounds in labor relations presented state-
ments concerning public employees in general. 
It is difficult to briefly summarize the statements of the 
conferees in a few major points. However, with a few exceptions, 
the conferees agreed that it would be desirable to have legisla• .. 
tion to establish guidelines and policies relative to public em·• 
ployee negotiations in Colorado, although many differences were 
expressed as to the content of legislation. Some of the most 
important differences of the conferees concerned whether legisla-
tion should separate teachers from other public employees; wheth-
er the scope of negotiations should be limited or unlimited; the 
relationship of negotiations to present civil service and to 
merit system procedures; and the issue of whether to attempt to 
prohibit strikes by public employees. As an example of one area 
of contention, s_ome educationa 1 interests advocated s.eparate 
legislation for teachers, while other educational organizations 
recommended coverage of all public employees in one bill. Scho()l 
board representatives generally were favorable toward legislation 
which would establish collective bargaining guidelines and which 
would clarify present questions in the negotiation procedures. 
Organizations representing the classroom teachers generally fav-
ored unlimited scope of negotiations on school matters, including 
school policy matters, while representatives of school boards 
rejected the idea of unlimited negotiations, favoring negotiations 
on only economic matters and conditions of employment. 
Another point of interest was the question of strikes in 
the public sector. While it was generally agreed that strikes in 
the public sector are not desirable and, in some cases, do great 
damage, strikes occurring in other states indicate that strike 
prohibitions with severe penalties are not effective methods of 
preventing public employee strikes. The alternative to prohibit-
ing strikes wo.uld be to establish some form of compulsory binding 
arbitration between the public employer and the exclusive bargain-
ing agent for the public employees. The problem involved in usE~ 
of binding arbitration involves constitutional issue~ to the ef-
fect that the responsibilities of an elected public body in set-




The committee was not in unanimous agreement on the ques-
tion of whether it is desirable for Colorado to enact legisla-
tion pertaining to public employee negotiations. However, the 
majority of the committee felt that legislation establishing col-
lective bargaining procedures for public employees in Colorado 
would be desirable. Legislation providing guidelines for the 
process of negotiations would be beneficial to public employers, 
as well as the public employees. For example, disputes involv-
ing recognition of an employee organization and jurisdictional 
disputes between competing employee organizations -- two major 
causes of work stoppages -- would be more easily resolved with 
legislative policy expressed on these subjects. Without legisla-
tive guidelines, a public employer might have some difficulty in 
deciding on suitable procedures for determining questions.such as 
which of two employee organizations will be granted status of a 
bargaining unit, and when would new elections on the question of 
employee representation be held. 
It is also argued that public employers would be protected 
under the proposed legislation since strikes against third par-
ties, secondary boycotts, and strikes during a contract period 
are prohibited. An example of these activities is a work stop-
page by employees in one jurisdiction in sympathy with employees 
on strike against another employer. Another example of a strike 
against a third party is a work stoppage in protest of an action 
(or lack of action) taken by a third party over whom the employer 
has no control. Such a case could involve teachers striking 
against school boards if the General Assembly does not provide 
the amount of state school aid that is requested by educational 
interests. Penalties against such actions are severe and may be 
imposed against individuals, employee organizations, or both indi-
viduals and organizations which support strikes noted above. 
Another argument presented for legislation is that, based 
on the experiences in other states, the numerous issues of nego-
tiations and strikes by public employees will need to be faced in 
Colorado and, sooner or later, it will be necessary that a state 
policy be established to provide an orderly process of solving 
complicated disputes in the public sector. To believe that the 
state of Colorado and its political subdivisions will be exempt 
from public employee disputes is probably not a realistic assump-
tion based on recent experiences in other states. It is argued 
that legislation would settle questions that might otherwise 
lead to conflict. 
It is for these reasons that the committee recommends en-
actment of legislation establishing procedures for negotiations 
between public employers and public employees in Colorado. Under 
the proposed bill, the state industrial commission would be re-
sponsible for regulating the provisions of the law. Exclusive 
bargaining agents would be designated through elections conducted 
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by employee$. "Dues check-off", the deduction of an employee's 
organization dues from his paycheck would specifically be author-
ized. The bill provides that employees would have the right to 
join any organization of their choosing, or to refrain from join-
ing an employee organization. 
The bill would not prohibit strikes in the public sector 
following the exhaustion of all negotiation procedures. An ex-
ception is made, however, in cases when a strike will endanger 
the public health or safety. If it is determined by the indus-
trial commission that the public health and safety will be ad-
versely affected by a strike, the governor, by executive order, 
may stop the strike for a forty day "cooling off period" during 
which time "any reasonable means" is used to resolve the dispute. 
Legislation on the subject of public employee negotiations 
probably will result in increased activity in organizing employ-
ees in unions and other organizations. The committee concluded 
that, in the long run, major public employee strikes may be 
averted if a framework of reasonable state legislation is avail-
able-for dealing with problems which other states have experi-
enced. 
Some committee members were opposed to the idea of state 
legislation dealing with public employee negotiations. Enact-
ment of negotiation legislation by the state was not considered 
necessary at this time since Colorado, without legislation, has 
had a good record of avoiding strikes in the public sector under 
the existing informal methods of negotiations. 
It was also argued that any type of work stoppage in the 
public sector is automatically illegal. Public employees are 
paid from taxes imposed on the entire public for certain govern-
mental functions. Since the public pays for these services, it 
is the duty of government to provide these services at all times. 
In addition, any public employee strike which directly endangers 
the public health, safety or welfare, such as a work stoppage by 
policemen, firemen, or sanitation workers, would be intolerable. 
It was noted that a law on public employee negotiations 
would be limited in the number of public employees that would or 
could be included in the law. College and university professors 
asked that they not be included under _the law; ~nd spokesmen for 
home rule cities urged that their employees not be included under 
the law because of the state constitutional provisions relating 
to home rule cities. State civil service employees may not bar-
gain effectively under any legislation because of the constitu-
tional powers of the civil service commission. Until these situ-
ations change, it was said to be useless.to attempt to enact 
meaningful collective bargaining legislation covering all public 
employees. 
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. Another argument against legislation was that elected of-
ficials are representatives of the general public, whether they 
serve on the school board, city council, or in the General As-
sembly. El:cte~ officials are granted certain powers by the 
state constitution or city charters, and these powers cannot be 
delegated to bargaining agents. In addition, none of the powers 
delegated to governing bodies, such as the power to appropriate 
money for salaries or to raise money through taxation can be sub-
ject to the negotiations process. 
It was pointed out that employers in the public sector are 
not ready for full collective bargaining negotiations and will 
not be able to bargain equally with employees after a law is . 
first enacted. Employees were said to have an advantage in nego-
tiations during the first year because of organizational experi-
ence in bargaining. Employees will be able to draw from experi-
enced negotiators affiliated with national unions or employee 
organizations, while public employers will be inexperienced in 
negotiations and will not have the resources to employ top nego-
tiators. The advantages of the employees in collective bargain-
ing may be a detriment to the general public since, in some cases, 
additional tax monies will be needed to reach agreement between 
the parties. 
Important Features of the Recommended Legislation 
When the committee commenced its bill drafting work, it 
was concluded that several issues should be covered in proposed 
legislation. Briefly these issues include: (1) the scope or 
coverage of the act; {2) a statement of the right of employees to 
organize and to bargain collectively; (3) who is the public em-
ployer; (4) provisions for administration of the act; (5) the 
scope of negotiations; (6) the procedures in the negotiations 
process, including the settlement of negotiation impasses; (7) 
unfair labor practices and penalties therefore; (8) whether any 
or all strikes would be illegal; and (9) whether penalties should 
be imposed for illegal work stoppages. 
The Scope of the Act. The committee's bill would include 
all employees of the state and its political subdivisions (Sec-
tion 80-22-3 (5)). The thinking of the committee was that all 
political subdivisions should be included under the act (Section 
80-22-3 (4)) since labor problems in any area of the state or 
local government would have an impact on the entire state and 
would be a matter of state-wide concern. 
The Right to Organize. The bill specifically authorizes 
public employees to organize and bargain collectively and enter 
into written agreements with their employers. (Section 80-22-4). 
Public employees would be granted the right to form or 
join, or to refrain from joining, any employee organization for 
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the purpose of negotiating. This concept establishes an "open 
shop'' in public employment which, simply stated, means that em-
ployees would not be required to join an employee organization 
in order to be employed in the public sector. (Section 80-22-4 
( l ) ) • 
Public employees would file a petition with the state in-
dustrial commission for recognition as the exclusive bargaining 
agent for the public employees of the proposed bargain unit .. 
The petition would allege that 50 percent or more df the employ~ 
ees of a bargaining unit desire to be ~epr~sented by ~n exclusive 
bargaining agent or that an existing bargaining ageht is no 
longer the choice of a majority of the public employees within 
the bargaining unit. If the industrial commission determines, 
after an investigation, that a question exists concerning repre-
sentation, it would issue an order requiring that a recognition 
election be held by secret ballot to determine the bargaining 
agent (Section 80-22-7). 
The industrial commission would be authorized to deter-
mine what is a bargaining unit if a situation arises in which two 
employee groups are asking for exclusive recognition. The indus-
trial commission also would make determinations as to who is the 
public employer and to identify the terms and conditions of em-
ployment that are and are not subject to negotiation, subject to 
legal restrictions on the scope of negotiations (Section 80-22-7 
(4)). 
In order for an employee organization to achieve certifi-
cation as the exclusive bargaining agent of a bargaining unit, a 
certification election must be held within the unit, and the. 
organization must receive a majority vote of the total number of 
employees in the unit (Section 80-22-8). 
Employees of all labor or employee organizations may re-
quest employers for dues check-off. Check-offs are permitted 
only at the request of the employee (Section 80-22-3 (12)). 
Who is the Public Employer? The question of defining the 
public employer was difficult for the committee to answer. There 
are several employers in the public sector which would have an 
important role in the negotiation process. As an example, on the 
state level, negotiations may have to be conducted with the Civil 
Service Commission, the General Assembly, and department heads, 
on various issues. Hence, the committee in defining public em-
ployer left the definition as broad as possible, stating that the 
public employer shall be the person or group of persons author-
ized to engage in collective bargaining by statute, ordinance, 
constitution, or rule or regulation. In the absence of specific 
authorization, the public employer shall be det~rmined by the 
industrial commission {Section 80-22-3 (4)). 
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.A~ministration of the Ac~. When deciding on the agency 
to administer the act, the committee had the choice of utilizing 
the present state industrial commission or establishing a sepa-
rate "Public Employee Labor Relations Board .. " It was decided 
t~at the industrial commission should administer the proposed act 
since machinery for labor-management relations_in the private 
sector already existed within the commission, and the commission 
is experienced in labor-management relations. 
The commission, under the bill, would be authorized the 
following additional powers: (1) to make rules and regulations 
concerning provisions of the proposed act; (2) to request, from 
public employers, as~istance in carrying out the provisions of 
the proposed act; (3) to make studies of conditiorisof public 
employment; (4) to prepare statistical data relating to salaries, 
wages, benefits, and employment practices in public and private 
employment and to make the data available to interested parties; 
{5) to establish procedures for recognition of bargaining agents 
and certification elections; (6) to resolve controversies con-
cerning recognition; and (7) to hold hearings pursuant to the ad-
ministrative code (Ch. 3, Art. 16, C.R.S. 1963, as amended) and 
under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to carry out the nec-
essary functions of the proposed bill (Section 80-22-6). 
Scope of Negotiations. The scope of negotiations is lim-
ited in the bill to the terms and conditions of employment (Sec-
tion 80-22-4 (2)). This term is defined as including any or all 
of the following, as may be determined by the industrial commis-
sion: salaries; wages; hours; working conditions; and any other 
perso~nel matters (Section 80-22-3 (11)). 
Collective Bargaining. It would be the duty of both the 
public employer, or its representative, and the exclusive bargain-
ing agent, or its representative, to enter into good faith nego-
tiations. Any agreement reached is to be reduced to writing and 
honored by the public employer and the exclusive bargaining agent. 
If any portion of an agreement would be in conflict with existing 
law, ordinance, rule, or regulation beyond the power of the pub-
lic employer to alter, the public employer would submit a pro-. 
posed amendment of the law, ordinance, rule, or regulation to the 
proper governmental unit for its action. The conflicting portion 
of the agreement shall not become effective until action is taken 
on any necessary amendment. If no action is taken the governing 
body, the portion of the agreement in conflict with the existing 
statute, ordinance, or rule or regulation would be void. The 
agreement shall then be returned to the public employer and the 
exclusive bargaining agent for further negotiation if further ne-
gotiation is deemed necessary by the parties {Section 80-22-10). 
In regard to funds necessary to carry out provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement, the public employer would 
submit the negotiated agreement to the appropriate budgeting 
agency on or prior to the budget submission date, and would make 
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every effort to secure the necessary funds to fulfill the terms 
of the agreement. If the necessary funds are not secured, the 
agreement shall be returned to the negotiating parties for fur-
ther negotiations within the framework of the amount of appropri-
ated funds (Section 80-22-10(4)). 
If after a collective bargaining agreement has gone into 
effect, and a dispute arises in the interpretation of the provi-
sions of the agreement, efforts for settlement of the agreement 
shall be made through the normal grievance procedure. Howevert 
if the dispute cannot be settled.by the grievance procedure, the 
dispute can be sent to the industrial commission for final arbi-
tration (Section 80-22-12). . 
Impasse in Collective Bargaining. If after a reasonable 
length of negotiations a dispute exists, or within 180 days prior 
to the budget submission date a dispute exists, an impasse shall 
be deemed to have occured. At this point, either party or both 
parties may petition the industrial commission to initiate medi-
ation. If the industrial cdmmission concludes that an impasse 
exists, it would prepore a list of three names of disinterested 
persons, one of which persons would be selected by both parties 
as the mediator. If the two parties fail. to select a mediator 
within five days, the industrial commission would appoint a medi-
ator. If the dispute is not settled within 30 days, the indus-
trial commission may: (1) discharge the mediator; (2) define the 
area of dispute; or (3) appoint a disinterested person as a fact 
finder (Section 80-22-11). · · ··· 
If a fact finder is appointed' in a dispute, he would hold 
hearings and would have the power to make recommendations. If 
the impasse is not resolved within 30 days,· the fact finder would 
transmit his recommendations for resolving the dispute to the 
negotiating parties and the industrial commission and would ma~e 
his findings known to the general public (Section 80-22-11 (5)). 
In the event agreement is not reached, the industria 1 comm is sTc>n 
would submit the findings and recommendations of the fact'finder 
along with recommendations for resolving the impasse of each ' 
bargaining party, to the appropriate legislative body at its next 
regular session (Section 80-22-11 (6))~. It is the intent of the 
committee that the cost of mediation and fact finding would be 
borne by the industrial commission. 
· Because of the delicate nature of the bargaining process, 
collective bargaining sessions, mediation sessions, and fact 
finding hearings would not be deemed "-public meetlngs" under 
Colorado statutes. The documents and other materials produced at 
these meetings would not be deemed public records subject to the 
"Open Public Records Act" (Ch. 66, Laws of 1968). However, the~ 
executed agreement, find~ngs and recommendations of the fact 
finder, and completed studies of the industrial commissio.n would 
be public records under Colorado law (Section 80-22-15). 
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. . Unfair La?or Practices •. The proposed act contains prohi-
bitions for unfair labor practJ.ces by both the public employers 
and publ~c employees: The prohibited unfair ~abor practices by 
!he publ:c employer include any of the fol~owing actions: (1) 
interfering with any of the rights of public employees granted 
under the proposed bill; (2) dominating or interfering with the 
formation or administration of a labor or employee organization 
or contributing financial support to it; (3) refusing to bargai~ 
collectively or refusing to bargain in good faith; (4) refusing 
to discuss grievances; (5) discharging or discriminating against 
any employee because of charges filed or testimony given by the 
employee under the bill; or (6) violating the provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement (Section 80-22-5 (2)). 
Labor or employee organizations are prohibited from en-
gaging in any of the following unfair labor practices: (1) in-
terfering or coercing any public employees in the exercise of any 
rights granted to them by the bill; (2) restraining, coercing, or 
interfering with a public employer in the selection of its repre-
sentative for collective bargaining purposes; (3) causing or 
attempting to cause a public employer to either discharge or dis-
criminate against a public employee for membership or nonmember-
ship in a labor or employee organization~ (4) refusing to bargain 
or refusing to bargain in good faith; (5J refusing to discuss 
grievances; or (6) violating any of the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement (Section 80-22-5 (3)). 
If a complaint of an unfair labor practice is filed with 
the industrial commission, and evidence indicates that an unfair 
labor practice has occurred, the commission shall issue a cease 
and desist order. The bill includes provisions for reinstatement 
of public employees and for revocation of certification of the 
organization as the exclusive bargaining agent in the case of un-
fair labor practices by either the employer or by the employees. 
Any final decisions of the industrial commission would be subject 
to judicial review (Section 80-22-13). 
Lawful Strikes. The committee concluded that the experi-
ence with strike prohibitions in other states indicated that 
strikes in the public sector cannot effectively be prohibited by 
legislation. Strikes are a part of the collective bargaining 
process and if collective bargaining fails, laws against strikes 
cannot prevent strikes. Under the bill, however, any strike 
which presents a danger to the public health or safety may be 
postponed for a 40-day period by executive order of the governor. 
During this period efforts would be made "using any reasonable 
means" to resolve the dispute (Section 80-22-11 (7)). . 
• Unlawful Strikes. The committee felt that strikes or 
work stoppages which occur in support or in sympathy of issues 
that are beyond the control of the negotiating parties should be 
considered illegal strike·s. These strikes would be in the form 
of secondary boycotts or strikes against a third party (Section 
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80-22-5 (1)). A strike against a public agency in Denver in sup-
port of a strike in Colorado Springs would be an example of an 
illegal strike against a third party, as defined in the proposed 
act {Section 80-22-3 (8)). 
In addition to strikes against a third party, the commit-
tee believed that legislation should prohibit strikes in breach 
of collective bargaining agreements, as defined in Section 80-22-
3 (7) of the proposed bill. Therefore, the committee also in-
cluded strikes during a collective bargaining agreement in the 
category of unlawful strikes (Section 80-22-5 (1)). 
Finally, the committee felt that strikes in the public 
sector should be avoided. Therefore, the committee declared that 
any strike that occurred prior to following all of the procedures 
for settling an impasse shall be an unlawful strike (Section 80-
22-11 (8) and Sec~ion 80-22-5 (1)). 
The committee felt the unlawful strikes described above 
should be subject to severe penalties. Therefore, penalties may 
be assessed against the individual striker, against the employee 
organization as a whole, or against both the individual and the 
organization. The industrial commission would be responsible for 
determining whether an unlawful strike exists. If it is deter-
mined that an unlawful strike exists the industrial commission 
would order the strikers to cease and desist (Section 80-22-14 
(1)). Individual strikers could be disciplined in any of the 
following ways: (1) placement on probation for a period of two 
years with respect to tenure of employment or contract of employ-
ment; (2) forfeiture of all increases in compensation for one 
year; and (3) filing of charges with the civil service commission 
for state civil service employees for discipline or dismissal in 
lieu of the above named penalties (Section 80-22-14 (2)). 
If it is determined by the industrial commission that an 
employee or labor organization was responsible for an unlawful 
strike, the commission would.render a cease and desist order. In 
addition, the industrial commission shall assess the following 
penalties if the strike persists: (1) a fine of one fifty-second 
of the total annual dues of the organization for each day the 
strike continues, except in cases where one fifty-second of the 
total membership dues is less than $1,000, in which case the 
daily fine shall be $1,000; and (2) shall revoke the right of 
membership dues deduction for a period not to exceed two years, 
but in no case shall the revocation of membership dues be less 
than one year, except in cases where the fine has not been fully 
paid by the striking organization in which case the dues shall 
continue to be deducted until the fine assessed against the or-
ganization has been fully paid (Section 80-22-14 (4)). 
In cases where a cease and desist order has not been com-
plied with by a labor organization, the industrial commission 
shall seek a court order from district court (Section 80-22-14 
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(5)). If the court order is not obeyed, the same penalties apply 
to striking employee organizations as those which can be applied 
by the industrial commission (Section 80-22-14 (8)). In addition, 
the cou~t may assess any penalties for contempt of court -- ~ 
fine not to exceed $250 a day or imprisonment in the county jail 
for a period not to exceed 30 days (Section 80-22-14 (7)). Any 
decision rendered by the industrial commission is subject to 
judicial review (Section 80-22-14 (9)). 
Other Provisions of the Proposed Bill. The sections in 
existing law affecting mass transportation systems and metropoli-
tan sewage disposal districts have been amended so employee or-
ganizations under these acts, would be placed under the proposed 
act (Section 80-4-2 (2), C.R.S. 1963 and Section 89-15-2 (2), 
C.R.S. 1963, as amended by Sections 2 and 5 of this bill). 
The suggested effective date of the bill is January 1, 
1970, which will provide time for the industrial commission to 
acquire the necessary staff and organization to provide for the 
administration of the law (Section 7 of the proposed bill). 
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THE MINORITY REPORT 
The undersigned committee members voted against recommend-
ing state legislation which would grant to public employees the 
right to enter into collective negotiations with public employ-
ers. These committee members base their opposition on three ma-
jor points -- (1) public employers are elected officials or rep-
resentatives of elected officials; (2) work stoppages in the 
public sector are illegal; and (3) interest in public employee 
negotiations is limited at this time. 
Public Employers Are Elected Officials or Representatives of 
Elected Officials 
It was argued that public employers are elected officials 
or representatives of elected officials. Public employers, 
whether school board members, members of a city council, members 
of the General Assembly, a mayor, or governor, are in turn rep-
resentatives of the general public. They are primarily respons-
ible to the general public, not to public employees. If the 
general public becomes dissatisfied with public employers, the. 
general public can change public employers through elections. 
Governing bodies have been authorized certain constitu-
tional or charter powers which cannot be delegated to any bar-
gaining agent. An example of these powers is taxation. If, 
through the negotiation process, public employees demand a raise 
in salary, and the bargaining agent for the public employer 
signed the agreement, which would be binding, the governing bod-
ies would be forced to raise taxes to meet the demands of th~ 
public employees. In this instance, the governing bodies would 
have unlawfully delegated their legislative authority, and in 
addition, they would no longer be representing the general pub-
lic. The end result of negotiations of this type in the public 
sector would be chaotic. Elected officials would no longer be 
serving the general public, but would be using the general pub-
lic to satisfy demands of public employees who because of their 
choice of employment are supposed to serve the general public. 
It was also pointed out by several public employers that 
they would be unprepared to meet the challenge of full scale 
collective negotiations. Public employers would be placed in a 
disadvantageous situation for some time, possibly over a year, 
since they would not have the resources nor personnel to bargain 
effectively. Public employees, on the other hand, could obtain 
both resources and top negotiating personnel from national or-
ganizations. The end result would probably be that public em-
ployers would be forced to meet the demands of public employees, 
possibly to the detriment of the general public. In some cases, 
the settlement of a collective bargaining agreement may result 
in requiring additional tax monies. Again the situation's end 
result would be chaos. 
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It is felt by the minority members of the committee that 
public employees should have the right to sit with public em-
ployers on an informal basis and be permitted ~o make recommen-
dations concerning salaries and other working conditions, which 
is presently being done in many areas of th~ public sector. 
However, if public employees and public employers sat as equals, 
across a bargaining table, the general public would no longer be 
represented, and their protected rights would become bargainable 
issues. 
Work Stoppages in the Public Sector Are Illegal 
The minority members of the committee believe that work 
stoppages in the public sector are illegal. They pointed out 
that government provides certain essential services which, if 
interrupted, would endanger the public health and safety. Exam-
ples of work stoppages which endanger public health and safety 
include police and fire protection and removal of trash or treat-
ing of sewage. 
In addition, it was pointed out that the services provided 
by the state and its political subdivisions are paid for by taxes 
imposed on the general public. Since the public pays for these 
services, it is the duty of government to provide these services 
at all times. 
Interest in Public Employee Negotiations Is Limited at This Time 
During committee hearings several conferees commented that 
they could not be included or did not desire to be included under 
the proposed public employee negotiations law. College and uni-
versity professors requested that they be exempted from the law, 
since they preferred their own method of obtaining salary in-
creases and improvements in working conditions. Spokesmen for 
home rule cities felt that their cities could not be included in 
a law relating to public employee negotiations. They argued that 
constitutional provisions relating to home rule cities would ex-· 
elude home rule cities from a state law (Art. XX, Sec. 6, Con-
stitution of Colorado). Finally, state civil service employees 
may not be capable of bargaining effectively due to the consti-
tuti9nal powers of the Colorado Civil Service Commission (Art. 
XII, Sec. 13, Constitution of Colorado). 
It was further argued that the issue of public employee 
negotiations tends to be a matter of local concern rather than 
state-wide concern. It was noted that prim~ry interest has been 
shown by employees, especially teachers, of the Denver metropol-· 
itan area, and employees in Colorado Springs and Pueblo. Each 
of these areas are home rule cities and may be exempted from the, 
law as has been noted above. If- legislation is to be enacted, 
it should be done by the municipalities where concern has been 
shown. 
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Until the required changes are made in the.state consti-
tution or there becomes a greater state-wide concern for public 
employee negotiations, it would be meaningless to enact legis-
lation permitting collective bargaining legislation including 
all public employees. 
This minority report is submitted to the members of the 
Legislative Council for its consideration. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Senator Frank L. Gill 
,/c~ ~~ 
( -/sc-t,-c,( C,, I//~ 
--nepresentative Paul E. Morris 
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First Regular Session 
Forty-seventh General Assembly 
STATE OF COLORADO 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
1 CONCERNING LABOR, AND PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE 
2 BARGAINING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, AND PLACING CERTAIN 
3 LIMITATIONS ON ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. 
4 Be it enacted E,Y. the General Assembly 2f the State of Colorado: 
5 SECTION 1. Chapter 80, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as 




PUBLIC EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
9 80-22-1. Short title. This a~ticle shall be known and 
10 may be cited as the "Colorado Public Employees Labor Relations 
11 Act of 1969". 
12 80-22-2. Declaration of policy. The general assembly of 
13 the_. state of Colorado declares that it is the public policy of 
14 the state and the purpose of this article to promote harmonious 
15 and cooperative relationships between government and its employ-
16 ees and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the 
17 orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government. 
18 Since unresolved disputes in the public service are injurious to 
19 the public, the governmental agencies, and public empioyees, ade-
20 quate means should be provided for preventing controversies 
21 between governmental agencies and public employees and for 
Capital letter, indicate new material to be added to ezi&ting statute. 
Dahe$ through the words indicate deletioru from uuting statute. 
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1 resolving them when they occur. These ends, the general assem-
2 bly believes, can best be attained by the enactment of a statute 
3 applicable to all public employees and all public employers of 
4 the state, by granting public employees the right of organiza-
5 tion, representation, and collective bargaining, by requiring 
6 that the state, local governmental un.its, and other political 
7 subdivisions of the state negotiate with, and enter into written 
8 agreements with labor or employee organizations representing 
9 public employees, insofar as such negotiations and agreements 
10 are not contrary to the state constitution, by granting addi-
11 tional powers to the industrial commission of Colorado to assist 
12 in resolving disputes between public employees and public empl.oy-
13 ers, and by providing methods for avoiding strikes by public 
14 employees. 
15 80-22-3. Definitions. (1) As used in this article, unless 
16 the context otherwise indicates: 
17 (2) "Commission" means the industrial commission of Colc,-
18 rado. 
19 (3) "Labor or employee organization" means any labor or 
20 employee organization of any kind that has as its primary pur-
21 po_se the improveme·nt of the terms and conditions of employment 
22 of public employees. 
23 (4) "Public employer" includes the state, a county, city, 
24 city and county, incorporated town, school district, special 
25 improvement district, county public improvement district, water 
26 district, sanitation district, sewage disposal dist~ict, fire 
27 protectlon district, metropolitan district, irrigation district, 
28 drainage district, public corporation, or any other kind of 
29 
xxviii 
l public district, or any other political subdivision of the state 
2 organized pursuant to law, -and shall be that person or group of 
3 persons specifically authorized by constitu~ion, statute, charter, 
4 ordinance, or resolution to engage in collective bargaining 
5 negotiations on behalf of a public employer. or employers concern-
6 ing terms and conditions of employment. In the absence of such 
7 authorization by constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, or 
8 resolution, the connnission shall designate the person or group 
9 of persons who shall be authorized to engage in collective bar-
10 gaining negotiations on behalf of a public employer or employers. 
11 (5) "Public employee" means any person holding a position 
12 by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, 
13 except that such term shall not include persons holding positions 
14 by appointment or employment in an executive capacity, or in the 
15 organized militia of the state. 
16 . (6) "Strike" means the willful failure to report for duty, 
17 the willful absence from one's position, the willful stoppage of 
18 work,-or the willful abstinence in whole or in part from the full, 
19 faithful, and proper performance of_the duties of employment with 
20 a public employer, for the purpose of inducing, influencing, or 
21 coercing a change -in the terms and conditions of employment or 
22 the rights, privileges, or obligations of.public employment. 
23 (?) ''Strike in breach of collective bargaining agreement" 
' ' 
24 means a strike during the term of .a collective bargaining agree.-
25 ment containing a provision that neither the exclusive bargain-
26 ing agent nor any public employee of the bargaining unit shall 
27 engage in a strike during the term of the agreement; 
28 (8) (a) "Strike against a third party" includes the 
29 
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l following acts by public employees: 
2 (b) The withholding of labor or services from their public 
3 employer during required working hours, the picketing of their 
4 public employer during required working hours, or the refusing 
5 to handle, install, use, or work on particular mater_ials, sup·• 
6 plies, equipment, products, or any other matter or thing for the 
7 purpose of coercing, intimidating, influencing, compelling, or 
8 inflicting damage upon a third party who is not their public 
9 employer and who is engaged in a labor dispute,· or for the pu·r-
10 pose_of bringing their public employer who is not a party to the 
11 labor dispute into a concerted plan to coerce,- intimidate, in-
12 fluence, compel, or inflict damage upon a third party who is not 
13 their public employer and who is engaged in a labor dispute; or 
14 (c) The willful failure to ·report for duty, the willful· 
15 absence from their positions, or the willful stoppage of work 
16 during required working hours for the purpose of partaking in. 
17 activities aimed at coercing, intimidating, influencing, or com-
18 pelling a third party who is not their public employer to perform 
19 a particular act or to refrain from performing a particular act. 
20 (9) "Labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning 
21 terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, or concerning the 
22 association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, 
23 maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms and conditions 
24 of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the 
25 proximate relation of employer and employee. 
26 (10) "Terms and conditions of employment" includes any or 
27 all of the fo~lowing that the connnission rules may be the sub-
28 ject of collective bargaining between a public employer and an 
29 
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l exclusive bargaining agent for a designated bargaining unit: 
2 Salaries, wages, hours, working conditions, and any other per-
3 sonnel matters •. 
4 (11) ''Collective bargaining" means the performance of the 
5 mutual obligations of the public employer and the exclusive bar-
6 gaining agent to meet at reasonable times, to confer and negoti-
7 ate in good faith, and to execute a written agreement with 
8 respect to collective negotiations concerning the terms and con-
9 ditions of employment, except that neither party shall be com-
10 pelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession 
11 unless otherwise provided in this article. 
12 (12) "Membership dues deduction" means the obligation or 
13 practice of a public employer to deduct from the salary or wages 
14 of a public employee an amount for the payment of such public 
15 employee's membership dues in a labor or employee organization 
16 upon the presentation to the public ·employer of dues deduction 
17 authorization cards signed by such individual public employee. 
18 Such term also means the obligation or practice of a public em-
19 player to transmit the sums so deducted to such labor or employee 
20 organization. 
21 (13) "Total amount of annual membership dues of the labor 
22 or employee organization" includes initiation fees, membership 
23 dues, ~nd any other periodic dues, and all assessments collected 
24 by or for a labor or employee organization in the twelve m~nth · 
25 period preceding any violation or contempt under the provisions 
26 of this article attributable to the members of such labor or 
'Z7 employee organization in that part of the collective bargaining 
28 unit actually in violation or co~tempt; but, if such violation· 
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l or contempt prevents the functioning of the entire collective 
2 bargaining unit or units represented by such labor or employee 
3 organization, it shall mean such fees, dues, and assessments 
4 attributable to the total number of members of the labor or 
5 employee organization in such unit or units. 
6 (14) ''Budget submission date'' means the date by which, 
7 under lnw or practice, a public employer's proposed budget, or 
8 a budget containing proposed expenditures applicable to such 
9 public employer, is submitted to the appropriate administrative 
10 or legtslative body. 
11 (15) ''Mass transportation system" means any system which 
12 transports the general public by bus, rail, or any other means 
13 of conveyance, moving along prescribed routes, except any rail-
14 road subject to the Federal Railway Labor Act, Title 45 U.S.C.A. 
1~ 80-22-4. Right of organization and representation. (1) 
16 Public employees shall have the right to form, join, and partici-
17 pate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating 
18 in, any labor or employee organization of their own choosing. 
19 (2) Public employees shall have the right to be represented 
20 by any labor or employee organization of their own choosing, to 
21 negotiate collectively through a certified exclusive bargaining 
22 agent with their public employer in the determination of the 
23 terms and condition of their employment, and to be represented 
24 in the determination of grievances arising thereunder. 
25 (3) Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent 
26 any public· employee from presenting, at any time, his own griev-
27 ances in person or py a representative of his own choosing to 
28 his public employer, and having such grievances adjusted without 
29 
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l the intervention of the exclusive bargaining agent, if the 
2 adjustment is not inconsistent with -the terms of the collective 
3 bargaining agreement then in effect and if the exclusive bar-
4 gaining agent has been given reasonable opportunity to be present 
5 at the initial meeting called for the resolution of .such griev-
6 ances. 
7 80-22-5. Strikes by public employees prohibited - pro-
8 hibited practices. (1) No public employee or labor or employee 
9 organization shall, either directly or indirectly, cause, insti-
10 gate, encourage, or engage in a strike in breach of a collective 
11 bargaining agreement or a strike agains~ a third party, as such 
12 terms are defined in this article, or a strike in violation of 
13 section 80-22-11 (8), nor shall any public employee or labor or 
14 employee organization obstruct, impede, or resist, either.directly 
15 or indirectly, any lawful attempt to terminate a strike in breach 
16 of a collective bargaining agreement or a strike against a third 
17 party, as such terms are defined in this article, or a strike in 
18 violation of section 80-22-11 (8). 
19 (2) (a) Public employers or their agents or representatives 
20 are prohibited from: 
21 (b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing public 
22 employees in the exercise of any rights granted to them under 
23 the provisions of this article; 
24 (c) Dominating or interfering with the formation or adminis-
25 tration of any· labor or employee organization, or .contributing 
26 financial or other support to it; 
27 (d) Encouraging or discouraging membership.in any labor 
28 or employee organization by discriminating in regard to hiring, 
29 
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l tenure or other conditions of employment; 
2 (e) Refusing to bargain collectively or to bargain col-
3 lectively in good faith, with the labor or employee organization 
4 certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for the public em-
5 ployees in the bargaining unit; 
6 (f) Refusing to discuss grievances or to discuss griev-
7 ances in good faith, with the representative of the labor or em-
8 ployee organizati.on certified as the exclusive bargaining agent 
9 for the public employee or employees involved; 
10 (g) Discharging or discriminating against a public employee 
11 because he has filed charges or given testimony under this arti-
12 cle; or 
13 (h) Violating the provisions, in effect, of any collective 
14 bargaining agreement to which it is a signatory party. 
15 (3) (a) Labor or employee organizations or their agents 
16 or representatives are prohibited from: 
17 (b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing public em-
18 ployees in the exercise of any rights granted to them under the 
19 provision of this article; 
20 (c) Restraining, coercing, or interfering with the public 
21 employer in the selection of its representative for the purposes 
22 of collective bargaining or adjustment of grievances; 
23 (d) Causing or attempting to cause a public employe~ to 
24 either discriminate against or discharge any public employee 
25 for membership· or nonmembership in a labor or· employee organiza-
26 tion; 
27 (e) Refusing to bargain collec~ively or to bargain collec-
28 .tively in good faith with the public employer if such labor or 
29 
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l employee organization has been certified as the exclusive bar-
2 gaining agent for_the public employees in the bargaining unit; 
3 (f) Refusing to discuss grievances or to discuss griev-
4 ances in good faith with the representative of the public employer 
5 if such labor or employee organization has been certified as the 
6 exclusive bargaining agent for the public employees in a bargain-
7 ing unit; or 
8 (g) Violating the effective provisions of any collective 
9 bargaining agreement to which it is a signatory party, except 
10 the violating of a provision that neither· the exclusive bargain-
11 ing agent nor any public employee of the bargaining unit shall 
12 engage in a strike during the term of the agreement which shall 
13 be an unlawful strike as provided in subsection (1) of this 
14 section. 
15 80-22-6. Additional powers of the corrnnission. (1) (a) 
16 In addition to any other powers prescribed in this article or 
17 in law, the connnission shall have the following powers: 
18 (b) To make, amend, and rescind, from time to time, such 
19 rules and regulations and to exercise such powers as may be 
20 necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of this article. 
21 (c) To request from any public employer, and such public 
22 employer is authorized to provide, such assistance, services, 
23 and data as will enable the conunission to properlr carry out 
24 its functions. 
25 (d) To make studies and analyses of conditions of employ-
26 ment of public employees throughout the state. 
27 (e) (i) To make studies of, but not limited to: 
28 (ii) The problems involved in public employee representation 
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1 and negotiations in Colorado, including, but not limited to, 
2 the problems of bargaining unit determination; 
3 (iii) Those terms and conditions of public employment that 
4 are open to negotiation in whole or in part; 
-5 (iv). Those terms and conditions of public employment that 
6 require administrative or legislative _approval; 
7 (v) Those tenns and conditions that are for determination 
8 solely by the qualified electors of the state or any political 
9 subdivision thereof, or by the appropriate legislative body, 
10 and to make such studies available to public employers and exclu-
11 sive bargaining agents. 
12 (f) To make available to public employers, labor or em-
13 ployee organizations, mediators, and fact finders, any statistical 
14 data relating to salarie·s, wages, benefits, and employment prac-
15 tices in public and private employment to assist them in resolv-
16 ing' the complex issues of negotiations. 
17 (g) To establish procedures consistent with the provisions 
18 of sections 80-22-7, 80-22-8, 80-22-11, 80-22-13, and 80-22-14. 
19 (h) To resolve, pursuant to such procedures established by 
20 it, questions and c~ntroversies conce·rning claims for recognition 
21 as exclusive bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, impasses in 
22 collective bargaining negotiations, charges of engagement in pro-
23 · hibited practices, and charges of pro~ibited striking by public 
24 employees. 
25 (i) To hold such hearings and make such inquiries as shall 
26 be necessary to carry out the functions ascribed to the commis-
27 sion by this article. 
28 (j) For the purposes.of such hearings and inquiries, to 
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l administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses and docu-
2 ments, take testimony and receive evidencey compel the attend-
3 ance of witnesses and the production of documents by the issu-
4 ance of subpoenas, and delegate such powers to any member of 
5 the commission or any person appointed by the commission for the 
6 performance of its function, as authorized by this article. Such 
7 subpoenas shall be regulated and enforced under article 16 of 
8 chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963, as amended, and the Colorado rules of 
9 civil procedure. 
10 80-22-7. Petition - claim for recognition as exclusive 
11 collective bargaining agent - investigatio•n. (1) (a) Any labor 
12 or employ~e organization acting on behalf of any public employee 
13 or group of public employees may file a petition wit~ the commis-
14 sion for r~cognition as the exclusive bargaining agent for the 
15 public employees of a proposed bargaining unit. The petition 
16 shall allege either: 
17 (b) That fifty per cent or more of the public employees 
18 within a proposed bargaining unit desire to be represented for 
19 purposes of collective bargaining of the terms and conditions of 
20 employment and the administration of grievances arising under 
21 the terms and conditions of employment; 
22 (c) That the labor-or employee organization presently 
23 certified as the exclusive bargaining agent is no longer the 
24 choice of a majority of the public employees of the bargaining 
25 unit as .their exclusive bargaining agent • 
26 (2) Any public employer may file a petition with the ccm-
27 missio_n alleging that one or more labor or employee organiz~ .. 
28 tions have presented to it a claim to be recognized as the· 
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1 exclusive bargaining agent for the public employees of a pro-
2 posed bargaining unit. 
3 (3) The cormnission shall investigate the petition to 
4 determine if a controversy or question concerning representation 
5 exists. 
6 (4) (a) Where a petition is filed pursuant to the provi-
7 sions of subsections (1) (b) or (2) of this section and the com-
8 mission finds after an investigation of the allegations of the 
9 petition that a question concerning representation exists, it 
10 shall: 
11 (b) Define the proposed bargaining unit and determine which 
12 public employees shall be qualified and entitled to vote at any 
13 election held by the commission. Such public employees shall be 
14 those public employees who shall be represented by the ex9lusive 
15 bargaining agent for purposes of collective bargaining; and 
16 (c) Identify the public employer or employers for purposes 
17 of collective bargaining with the exclusive bargaining agent; and 
18 (d) Identify the terms and conditions of employment that 
19 shall be subject to negotiation between the public employer and 
20 the exclusive bargaining agent, and those terms and conditions 
21 that shall not be subject to negotiation, in accordance with any 
22 provisions of the state constitution or any law, or any home 
. . 
23 rule charter or ordinance enacted ·pursuant thereto; and 
24 (e) Order an election by s~cret baliot. 
25 (5) Where a petition is filed pursuant to the· provisions 
26 of subsection {l) (c) of this section and the commission finds 
27 after an investigation of the allegations of the petition that 
28 a controversy concerning representation exists·, it shall order 
29 
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1 an election by secret ballot. 
2 (6) (a) In defining a proposed bargaining unit, the com-
3 mission shall take into consideration, among other factors: 
4 (b) The desires and recommendations of the public employees 
5 to be represented; 
6 (c) The duties, skills, and working conditions of the pub-
7 lie employees to be represented; 
8 (d) The geographical location of the public employer or of 
9 the public employees to be represented, or both; 
10 (e) The occupational classification of the public employees 
11 to be represented; 
12 (f) The extent of organization among the public employees 
13 to be represented; and 
14 (g) The principles of efficient administration of goyernment. 
15 80-22-8. Election to determine exclusive bargaining agent -
16 ballot - limitation on elections. {1) Where a petition is filed 
17 by a labor or employee organization pursuant to section 80-22-7 (1), 
18 the election ballot shall contain the name of the petitioning 
19 labor or employee organization, and the name or names of any other 
20 labor or employee organization showing written proof of at least 
21 ten per cent representation of the public employees within the 
22 defined bargaining unit. Where a petition is filed by a public 
23 employer pursuant to section 80-22-7 (2), the election ballot shall 
24 contain the names of the one or more labor or employee organiza~ 
25 tions claiming recognition as the exclusive bargaining_ agent for 
26 the defined bargaining unit. The ballot, whether the petition is 
27 filed pursuant to section 80-22-7 (1) or (2), shall also contain 
28 a statement that may be marked by any public employee voting that 
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1 he does not desire to be represented by any of the named labor 
2 or employee organizations. 
3 (2) Where the names of three or more labor or employee 
4 organizations are on the election ballot and none of the three 
5 or more choices receives the votes of a majority of the total 
6 number of public employees within the defined bargaining unit, 
7 a run-off election shall be held. The run-off election ballot 
8 shall contain the names of the two labor or employee organiza-
9 tions that previously received the largest and second-largest 
10 number of votes. Such run-off election ballot shall also con-
11 tain a statement that may be marked by any public employee voting 
12 that he does not desire to be represented by either of said labor 
13 or employee organizations. ·only where the names of three or more 
14 labor or employee organizations appear on the ballot shall there 
15 be a run-off election ordered, and only one such run-off election 
16 shall be held. 
17 (3) No question concerning representation shall be raised 
18 by any public employee, group of public employees, labor or 
19 employee organization, or public employer within one year after 
20 a certification or after an election or run-off election when 
21 ordered for a certification where no labor or employee organiza-
22 tion received the votes of a majority of the total number of pub-
23 lie employees within the defined bargaining unit. 
24 80-22-9. Certification of exclusive bargaining agent 
25 scope of representation. (1) No labor or employee organization 
26 shall be certified by the commission as the exclusive bargaining 
27 agent of a bargaining unit unless such labor or employee organi-
28 zation received-the votes of a majority of the total number of· 
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l public employees in the bargaining unit. 
2 (2) (a) Any labor or employee organization certified as 
3. the exclusive bargaining agent of a bargaining unit shall: 
4 (b) Exclusively rep_resent all the publi~ employees within 
5 the bargaining unit, whether or not any such public employee is 
6 a member of said labor or employee org_anization, for purposes of 
7 collective bargaining of the terms and conditions of employment 
8 and the administration of grievances arising thereunder; and 
9 (c) Have unchallenged representation status as provided in 
10 this article until loss of certification. 
11 80-22-10. Collective bargaining, duty of public employer 
12 and exclusive bargaining agent - collective bargaining agree-
13 ments - void provisions - approval or rejection of provisions. 
14 (1) Whenever a labor or employee organization has been certified, 
15 pursuant to the provisions of this article, as the exclusive bar-
16 gaining agent for a bargaining unit, such labor or employee 
17 organization and the appropriate public employer or employers 
18 shall bargain collectively in the determination of the terms and 
19 conditions of employment of the public employees within the bar-
2O gaining unit. The public employer, or its representative, and 
21 the exclusive bargaining agent, or its representative, shall meet 
22 at reasonable times and confer in good faith. Any agreement 
23 reached by the negotiators shall be reduced to writing, and such 
24 written collective bargaining agreement shall be executed by the 
25 public employer and ~he exclusive bargaining agent. 
26 (2) Any collective bargaining agreement that contains a 
27 provision for automatic renewal·or extension, or prov~des for a 
28 term of existence of more -than three y~ars shall be void in its 
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l entirety. Any provision of a collective bargaining agreement 
2 that is in conflict with the state constitution or with an 
3 applicable home rule city charter shall be void in its entirety. 
4 (3) If any provision of a collective bargaining agreement 
5 is in conflict with any statutory law, ordinance, r~le, regula-
6 tion, or bylaw over which the public employer has no amendatory 
7 power, the public employer shall submit to the appropriate 
8 governmental body having amendatory power a proposed amendment to 
9 such law, ordinance, rule, regulation, or bylaw, and shall make 
10 every effort to secure its approval. Unless and until such amend-
11 ment is enacted or adopted and becomes ·effective, the conflicting 
12 provision of the collective bargaining agreement shall not become 
13 effective. If such amendment is not enacted or adopted, the con-
14 flicting provision of the collective bargaining agreement shall in 
15 no way be considered a part of the collective bargaining agreement 
1.,, and shall be returned to the public· employer and the exclusive 
• 
17 bargaining agent for further negotiation, at their discretion. 
J 
18 (4) The public employer shall submit to the appropriate 
19 appropriating or tax· levying body, as the case may be, a request 
20 on or before the budget submission date for such funds or a tax 
21 levy to raise such funds as shall be sufficient to fund the pro-
22 visions of the collective bargaining agreement and shall make 
23 every effort to secure its approval. If less than the requested 
24 amount is appropriated or will be produced by the certified tax 
25 levy, the coliective bargaining agreement shall be returned to 
26 the public employer and the exclusive bargaining agent for fur-
27 ther negotiations within the framework of the amount of the funds 
28 so appropriated or to be produced by the certified'tax levy. 
29 
xlii 
l 80-22-11. Collective bargaining negotiations - impasse -
2 mediation - fact finding. (1) If, after a reasonable period of 
3 negotiation concerning the terms and conditions of employment to 
4 be incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement, a dispute 
5 exists between a public employer and an exclusive bargaining agent, 
6 or if no agreement is reached within one hundred eighty days prior 
7 to the budget submission date of the public employer, an impasse 
8 shall be deemed to have occurred. Where an impasse occurs, either 
9 the public employer or the exclusive bargaining agent, or both 
10 jointly, may petition the commission t_o initiate mediation. 
11 (2) Upon receipt of such petition, the commission shall 
12 make an investigation to detennine if an impasse exists. If the 
13 commission finds that an impasse exists, it shall initiate media-
14 tion. The commission shall submit to the public employer and the 
15 exclusive bargaining agent a list containing the names of three 
16 qualified disinterested persons. The public ~mployer and the ex-
17 elusive bargaining agent shall select one person from such list 
18 to serve as the mediator, and shall notify the commission of 
19 their choice. If the public employer and the exclusive bargaining 
20 agent fail to select the mediator within five calendar days after 
21 the rece_ipt of the list, the couunission shall appoint the person 
22 who shall serve as the mediator. 
23 (3) (a) If the impasse is not.resolved within thirty days 
24 after the selection ~r appointment of the mediator, the commission, 
25 after consultation with the mediator, may: 
26 (b) Discharge _the mediator;. and 
27 (c) Define the area or areas of dispute; and 
28 (d) Appoint a qualified disinterested person to serve as a fact 
29 finder.for the board with respect to such area or areas of dispute. 
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1 (4) Where a fact finder is appointed, he shall set a time., 
2 date, and place for an initial hearing which •Shall be, where feas -
3 1.b le , in a loca li.ty convenient to . the _pub lie employer or emp layers 
4 and the exclusive ba~gaining agent. Hearings shall be conduc.ted in 
5 accordance with rules established by the .comrniss,ion. Upon reques.t 
6 of the fact finder, or the public employer or employers., or the 
7 exclusive bargaining .agent, the commission shall issue subpoenas 
.8 for any hearings conducted by the fac.t finder. The fact finder 
.9 shall have, i~ addition to the powers delegated to him by the com-
10 mission, the power to make public reconunendations for the resolu-
11 tion of the dispute. 
12 (5) If the dispute is not resolved within thirty days after 
13 the appointment of the fact finder, the fact finder shall immedi-
i4 ately transmit his findings of fact and recommendations for resolu-
15 tion of the dispute to the public employer or employers, the exclu-
16 sive bargaining agent,.and the commission, and shall simultaneously 
17 make public such findings and recommendations. 
18 (6) In the event that either the public employer or employers, 
19 or the exclusive bargaining agent does not accept in whole or in 
~ part the recommendations of the fact finder, the commission shall 
·21 submit the findings of fact and recommendations of the fact finder 
22 to the appropriate legislative body at its next regular ~r special 
23 meeting or session. The commission shall also submit at the same 
24 time separate reconnnendations for resolving the dispute from the. 
25 public_ employe·r and the exclus.ive bargaining agent involved. 
26 (7) In the event that the exclusive bargaining agent does not 
27 accept in whole or in part the determination of the· legislative body, 
28 and the public employees of the· barsaining unit vote to strike 
29 against- the public employer or employers involved, the exclusive 
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l bargaining agent shall file with the conunission a notice of intent 
2 to strike at least twenty days prior to the date on which such 
3 strike is scheduled to cormnence. The commission shall immediately 
4 notify the public employer or employers involved of the filing of 
5 the notice of intent to strike, and shall make a determination 
6 whether the strike will endanger the public health or safety. 
7 Prior to the expiration of the twenty-day period, the commission 
8 shall notify the public employer or employers involved, the exclu-
9 sive bargaining agent, and the governor of its determination. 
10 Where the commission determines that the strike will endanger the 
11 public health or safety, the governor may is~ue an order postponing 
12 the •intended strike for a period of forty days next following the 
13 date on which the strike was to have commenced, and shall use any 
14 reasonable means at his command to resolve the dispute. 
15 (8) The provisions of this section relating to procedures 
16 for resolving an impasse_shall be complied with before any employee 
17 or labor or employee organization shall engage in a strike. 
18 80-22-12. Disputes concerning interpretation or performance 
19 of agreement. Where a dispute arises between a public employer and 
20 an exclusive bargaining agent concerning the interpretation of the 
21 provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, or concerning the 
22 performance or nonperformance by either party of the provisions of 
23 such collective bargaining agreement, the public employer and exclu-
24 sive bargaining .agent shall initially attempt to resolve such dis-
25 pute through procedures established for grievances. In the event 
26 that the dispute is not resolved through such grievance procedures, 
27 the public employer and exclusive bargai~ing agent.·sh~ll submit the 
28 dispute to arbitration in accordance with the Colorado rules of 
29 civil procedure. 
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l 80-22-13. 'Prohibited practices - procedure - remedies. (1) 
2 Whenever a charge is filed with the commission alleging that any 
3 person, public employer, or labor or employee organization has 
4 engaged in or is engaging in any of the practices prohibited by 
5 the provisions of·section 80-22-5 (2) or (3), the commission 
6 shall issue and cause to be served upon such person, public em-
7 player, or labor or employee organization a complaint stating 
8 the charges and containing a notice of hearing before the commis-
9 sion or a hearing examiner, which may be a member of the commis-
JO sion, at a place therein fixed and on a da~e not less than five 
11 days after the service of th~ complaint. 
12 (2) No complaint shall be issued based upon any prohibited 
13 practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of 
14 the charges with the commission, unless the person aggrieved 
15 thereby was p~evented from filing the charges by reason of serv-
16 ice ·in the armed forces of the United States, in which event the 
17 six-month period shall be computed from the day of such person's 
18 discharge. 
19 (3) Any complaint may be amended by the hearing examiner, 
20 or the commission, at any time prior to the issuance of an order 
21 of the commission based thereon. The person, public employer, 
22 or la~or or employee organization complained of shall have the 
23 right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint 
24 within ten days after the service of a copy thereof, or within 
25 such other time as the hearing examiner or the commission may 
26 detennine, to appear in person or by counsel, to call witnesses, 
27 and to give testimony in defense at the time and place fixed in 
· 28 the notice. In the d~scretion of the hearing examiner or the 
29 
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l commission, any other person, public employer, or labor or employee 
2 organization may be permitted to intervene in the proceeding and 
3 to present testimony and cross-examine witnesses. In any hearing, 
4 the hearing examiner or the commission shall not be bound by.the 
5 technical rules of evidence. 
6 (4) The testimony taken before the hearing examiner or the 
7 connnission shall be reduced to writing and filed with the com-
8 mission. Thereafter, the commission, upon notice, may take 
9 further testimony or hear additional argument. 
10 (5) If upon a preponderance of the testimony taken, the 
11 commission determines that the person, public employer, or labor 
12 or employee organization complained of has engaged in or is en-
13 gaging in a practice prohibited by the provisions of section 
14 80-22-5 (2) or (3), it shall state its findings of fact and shall 
15 issue and cause to be served upon such person, public employer, 
16 or labor or employee organization an order requiring him or it to 
17 cease and desist from the prohibited practice. 
18 (6) The commission may take such affirmative action, in-
19 eluding reinstatement of public employees or the revocation of 
20 certification of an exclusive bargaini~g agent, as will effectu-
21 ate the policies and purposes of this article. Where a public 
22 employee was removed through proceedings instituted before the 
23 state civil service connnission, the industrial commission shall 
24 not order reinstatement of such public employee. 
25 (7) If upon a preponderance of the testimony taken, the 
26 commission detennines that the person, public employer, or labor 
27 or employee organization complained of has not engaged in or is 
28 not engaging in a practice ·prohibited by the pr~visions of sec-
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l tion 80-22-5- (2) or (3), then the commission shall state its 
2 findings of fact, and shall issue an order dismissing the com-
3 plaint. No order of the commission shall require the reinstate-
4 ment of any public employee who has been suspended or discharged, 
5 or the payment to him of any back pay, if such public employee 
6 was lawfully suspended or discharged for cause. 
7 (8) Until the record in any proceeding has been filed in 
8 court, the commission, at any time, upon reasonable notice and in 
9 such manner as it deems proper, may modify or set aside, in whole 
10 or part, any finding or order made or issued by•it. The commis-
11 sion may petition the district court in'the district where the 
12 complained of person resides, or where the public employer exer-
13 cises its governmental function, or where the labor or employee 
14 organization has a business office, as the case may be, or where 
15· the prohibited practice has been or is being engaged in, for the 
16 enforcement of the order. The court may enforce the order of the 
17 commission, or modify and enforce such order as modified, or set 
18 aside such order. The finding of the commission with respect to 
19 any question of fact shall be conclusive upon the court, unless 
20 any such finding is based upon evidence so minimal as to amount 
21 to an abuse of discretion. Upon the filing of the record of the 
22 proceeding by the commission with a district court, such district 
23 court shall have exclusive jurisdiction and its judgment shall be 
24 final, except that such judgment shal_l be ·subject to review by the 
25 supreme court in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil pro-
26 cedure. 
27 (9) Any person, public employer, or labor or employee or-
·28 ganization aggrieved by a final order of the.commission may seek 
29 
xlviii 
l judicial review pursuant to section 3-16-5, C.R.S. 1963. The 
2 commencement of judicial review pursuant to section 3-16-5, 
3 C.R.S. 1963, shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court,· 
4 operate to stay an order of the commission. 
5 (10) Complaints and petitions for appellate review filed 
6 under this section shall be heard expeditiously by the court to 
7 which presented, and shall take precedence over other civil cases, 
8 except earlier cases arising under this section or cases arising 
9 under section 80-22-14. 
10 (11) The commission may, upon the issuance of a complaint 
11 as provided in subsection (1) of this section charging that a 
12 person, public employer, or labor or employee organization has 
13 engaged in or is engaging in• a prohibited practice, petition the 
14 district court where the alleged prohibited practice in question 
15 is occurring, or where such person resides, or such public employ-
16 er exercises its governmental functions, or such labor or employee 
17 organization has a business office, as the case may be, for 
18 appropriate temporary relief or restraining order in accordance 
19 with the Colorado rules of civil procedure, and the court shall 
20 have jurisdiction to grant to the connnission such temporary re-
21 lief or restraining order as it deems just and proper. 
22 80-22-14. Strikes - violations - procedure - penalties. 
23 (1) Whenever a charge is filed with the commission alleging that 
24 a public employee, or group of public employees, or a labor or 
25 employee organization has violated or is violating the provisions 
26 of section 80-22-5 (1), the commission shall immediately issue 
27 and cause to be served upon such public employee, group of pub~ic 
28 employees, o~ labor or employee organization a complaint ·stating 
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l the charges, and·containing a notice of hearing before the com-
2 mission or member there9f, at a place therein fixed, not more 
3 than two days after the service of. a copy of the complaint. Where 
4 such public employee or the members of the group o_f public em~ 
5 ployees are members of a "labor or employee organization", as 
6 such term is defined in this article, whether or not such organ-
7 ization is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent pursuant 
8 to t~e provisions of sections 80-·22-8 and 80-22-9, service may be 
9 made upon such labor or employee organization in lieu of service 
10 upon such public employee or the members of the group of public 
11 employees. The public employee, or group of public employees_, 
► 
1.2 or labor or employee organization shall have the right to file 
13 an answer to the complaint, to be represented by counsel, to 
14 summon witnesses, and to give testimony and cross-examine wit-
15 nesses in defense at the tine and place fixed in ·the notice for 
16 the ·hearing. At any hearing, the connnission, or any member there-
17 of, shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence. The 
18 commission shall file its decision and order within one day after 
19 the termination of the hearing. 
20 (2) (a) If the commission determines upon a preponderance 
21 of the testimony taken that the public employee or group of pub-
22 lie employees complained of has violated or is violating the 
23 provis~ons of section 80-22-5 (1), the commission shall state 
24 its findings of fact, and: 
25 (b) Shall, if it is detennined that such violation is still 
26 continuing, issue and•cause to be served upon such public employee, 
27 or the members of the group of public employees, or·t~e labor or 
.·28 employee org~nization of which he or ~hey a~e membe~s, an order 
29 
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l requiring him or them to cease and desist from such ~iolation;· 
2 and 
3 (c) May order that such publi~ employee or group~£ public 
4 employees be disciplined in accordance with procedures established 
~ by law for misconduct; and 
6 (d) Shall order that such public employee or group of pub-
7 lie employees be placed on probation for a period of two years 
8 with.respect to tenure of employment or contract of employment, 
9 .as the case may be; and 
10 (e) Shall order that such public employee or group of pub-
11 lie employees forfeit all increases in compensation and benefits, 
12 if any, that such public employee or group of public employees 
13 would be entitled to by reason of his or their public employment 
14 for a period of one year next following the connnencement of the 
15 violation of the provisions of section 80-22-5 (1). 
16 (f) Where such public employee or group of public employees 
17 is within the classified civil service of the state, the provi-
18 sions of paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this subsection (2) 
19 shall not be applicable. In lieu thereof, the public employer or 
20 employers shall file charges with the state civil service commis-
21 sion for discipline or removal as provided in the state constitu-
22 tion and the laws and rules enacted or adopted in pursuance 
23 thereof.• 
24 (3) If the commission determines upon the preponderance of. 
25 the testimony taken that such public employee or group of public 
26 employees has not violated and is not violating the provisions 
27 of section 80-22-5 (1), the commission s?all st?te its findings 
28 of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the complaint. 
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l (4) (a) If the commission determines upon a preponderance 
2 of the testimony taken that the labor or employee organization 
3 complained of has violated or is violating the provisions of 
4 section 80-22-5 (1), the commission shall state its findings of 
5 fact, and: 
6 (b) Shall, if it is detennined that such violation is still 
7 continuing, issue and cause to be served upon such labor or em-
8 ploy~e organization an order requiring it to cease and desist 
9 from such violation; and 
10 (c) Shall impose for each day that the violation of section 
11 80-22-5 (1) persists a fine in an amount equal to one fifty-second 
12 of the total amount of the annual membership dues of such labor or 
13 employee organization, as defined in this article, except where 
14 an amount equal to one fifty-second part of the total amount of 
15 the annual membership dues of such labor or employee organization 
16 is less than one.thousand dollars, such fine shall be imposed in 
17 the amount of one thousand dollars; and 
18 (d) Shall revoke the right of membership dues deduction for 
19 a period not to exceed two years, but in no event less than one 
20 year, and shall forthwith notify the public employer and the labor 
21 or employee organization involved of such revocation; except, 
22 that where a fine is imposed on such labor or employee organiza-
23 tion pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsec-
24 tion (4), or subsection (8) of· this section, or a fine previously 
25 imposed on such labor or employee organization pursuant to the 
26 provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection (4), or subsecti~n 
27 (8) of this section, remains wholly or· partly unpaid after the 
28 exhaustion of the.cash and securities of ·such labor or employee 
~ 
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l organization, the commission shall direct, in a supplemental 
2 order if necessary, that, notwithstanding such revocation, such 
3 membership dues deduction shall be continued to the extent neces-
4 sary to pay such fine and the public employer invoived shall 
5 transmit such moneys to the commission, if the fine was imposed 
6 by the commission, or the court, if the fine was imposed by the 
7 court. 
8 (5) Where the commission has issued and caused to be served 
9 upon such labor or employee organization a cease and desist order, 
10 as provided in subsection (4) (b) of this section, such labor or 
11 employee organization shall immediately comply with such order. 
12 In the event that such labor or employee.organization fails to 
13 comply with such cease and desist order within one day after serv-
14 ice upon it of such order, the commission shall petition the dis-
15 trict court in the district where the violation of section 80-22-5 
16 (1) is occurring, or where the labor or employee organization has 
17 its business office, for the enforcement of such cease and desist 
18 order. The court may enforce the cease and desist order, or 
19 modify and enforce such order as modified, or set aside such 
20 order. The finding of the connnission with respect to any ques-
21 tion of fact shall be conclusive upon the court, unless any such 
22 finding is based upon evidence so minimal as to amount to an 
23 abuse of discretion. Upon the filtng of the"record of the pro-
24 ceeding by the commission with a district court, such district 
25 court shall have exclusive jurisdiction and its judgment shall 
26 be final, except that such judgment shall be subject to review 
27 by the supreme court in accordance with the Colorado rules of 
28 civil procedure. 
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l (6) The commission may, upon the issuance of a complaint as 
2 provided in subs~ction (1) of this section charging-that a public 
3 employee or group of public employees or labor or employee organ-
4_ ization has violated or is violating the provisions of section 
5· 80-22-5 (1), petition the district court in the district where' 
6 the alleged violation is occurring, or where the public employee 
7 resides, or any of the group of public employees reside, or where 
8 the labor or employee organization has its business office, as 
~ the case may be, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining 
lQ order in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure, 
ll and the court shall have jurisdiction to grant to the commission 
12 such temporary relief or :restraining order as it deems just and 
13 proper. 
i4 (7) Where a public employee or group of public empl~yees or 
1~ any officer of a labor or employee organization willfully disobeys 
16 a lawful order of a court, or willfully offers resistance to such 
17 lawful order, in a case involving or growing out of a violation 
18 of section 80-22-5 (1), the punishment for such contempt shall 
19 be a fine, not to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, or im-
20 prisonment, not to exceed thirty days,. in the jail of the county 
21 where the court is sitting, or both such fine and imprisonment. 
22 Where a person is committed to jail for the nonpayment of such a 
23 fine, he shall be discharged at the expiration of thirty days; 
24 but where he is also committed for a definite time, the thirty 
25 days shall be computed from the ~xpiration of the ·definite time. 
26 (8) (a) Where a labor or employee organization willfully . 
27 disobeys a lawful order of a court, or willfully·offers resist-
.. 
28 ance to such lawful order, in a case involving or growing out of 
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1 a violation of section 80-22-5 (1), the punishment shall be, for 
2 each day that such contempt persists, a fine fixed by the court 
3 in an amount equal to one fifty-second of the total amount of the 
4 annual membership dues of such labor or employee organization, as 
5 defined in this article, except that where an amount.equal to one 
6 fifty-second part of the total amount of the annual membership 
7 dues of such labor or employee organization is less than one 
8 thousand dollars, such fine shall be fixed in the sum of one 
9 thousand dollars. 
10 (b) In the event that membership dues are collected by the 
11 public employer, the books and records of such public employer 
12 shall be prima facie evidence of the amount so collected. 
13 (9) Any public employee, group of public employees, labor 
14 or employee organization, or public employer aggrieved by P final 
15 order of the commission may seek judicial review pursuant to 
16 section 3-16-5, C.R.S. 1963. The commencement of judicial review 
17 pursuant to section 3-16-5, C.R.S. 1963, shall not, unless specif-
18 ically ordered by the court, operate to stay an order of the com-
19 mission. 
20 (10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the 
21 contrary, where a public employee, or group of public employees, 
22 or a labor or employee organization plans, proposes, or threatens 
23 ac~ion in violation of section 80-22-5. (1), and the public em-
24 player involved has reasonable cause to believe that such viola-: 
25 tion is imminent, such public employer may apply to the district 
26 court in the district where such.public employee resides, or where 
27. any of such gr_oup · of public employees resides, or where such labor 
28 or employee organization has a business office, as the case may 
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1 be, or where the violation will occur, for a restraining order 
2 and an injunction restraining and enjoining such violation. If 
3 an order of su~h district court restraining or enjoining such 
4 violation does not receive compliance, the public employer shall 
5 immediately apply to the district court to punish such contempt 
6 under subsections (7) or (8) of this section, as the case may be, 
7 and shall immediately file charges with the connnission under sub-
s section (1) of this section. 
9 (11) Complaints and petitions for appellate review filed 
10 under this section shall be heard expeditiously by the court to 
11 which presented, and shall take precedence over other civil 
12 cases, except earlier cases arising under this section. 
13 80-22-15. Collective bargaining and mediation session and 
I 
1~4 · fact finding hearings not open meetings - public records. (1) 
1"5 Collective bargaining negotiation sessions between the exclusive 
.1, 
16 bargaining agent and the public employer or employers, mediation 
i1 sessions, and fact finding hearings provided for in this article 
.' 
l.8 shall not be deemed "public meetings" subject to the provisions 
19 of section 3-19-1, C.R.S. 1963, and any interim documents, re-
~O ports, transcripts, and agreements produced during such sessions 
21 or hearings shall not be deemed "public records" subject to the 
22 provisions of chapter 66, Session Laws of Colorado 1968. 
23 (2) The executed collective bargaining agreement, the find-
24 ings of facts and recommendations of the fact finder, a.nd docu- . 
25 ments embodying completed studies and analyses of the commission 
26 made pursuant to authority granted.in this article shall be 
27 deemed "public records" within the meaning of chapter G6, Ses-
• 28 sion Laws of Colorado 1968. 
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l 80-22-16. Protection of certain employees. (1) (a) Be-
2 fore the state or any board, commission, agency, or instrumental-
3 ity thereof, or any city, city and county, county, or combination 
4 thereof shall acquire and operate any property of a privately or 
5 publicly o~med mass transportation system, fair and equitable 
6 protective arrangements, as determined by the commission, shall 
7 be made to insure certain rights of employees. Such protective 
8 arrangements shall include, without being limited to, such pro-
9 visions as_rnay be necessary to.accomplish the following objectives: 
10 (b) The preservation of existing rights, privileges, and 
11 benefits of employees under existing collective bargaining agree-
12 ments between the mass transportation system and the employees 
13 thereof, including the continuation of all pension rights and 
14 benefits of the employees and their beneficiaries. 
15 (c) The continuation of all collective bargaining in any 
16 and all situations wherein it existed at the time of such 
17 acquisition insofar as such collective bargaining does not vio-
18 late the provisions of this article, and the assurances of ern-
19 ployment of all the employees of such mass transportation system 
20 so acquired. 
21 (d) The protection of all individual employees with respect 
22 to their employment, including priorities, seniorities, and 
23 right of advancement when in agreement with any existing collec-
24 tive bargaining agreement. 
25 (e) Training and retraining programs of employees and man-
26 aging personnel. 
27 (2) The contract whereby any property of a privately ·or 
28 publicly owned mass transportation system is acquired shall 
29 
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l specify, with particularity, the terms and conditions of all the 
2 protective arrangements as set forth in this section, including 
3 all other protective arrangements which may be added through 
4 collective bargaining or by direction of the ·commission. 
5 (3) The de.termination of the sufficiency of protective 
6 arrangements shall be made by the connnission in accordance with 
7 such rules and regulations as the commission may from time to 
8 time establish. 
9 SECTION 2. 80-4-2 (2)., Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965 
10 Supp.), is amended to read: 
11 80-4-2. Definitions. (2) The term "employer" means a per-
1,2 son who regularly engages the services of eight or more employees 
13 other than persons within the classes expressly exempted under 
14 the terms of subsection (3) of this section, and includes any 
~5 person acting on behalf of any such employer within the scope of 
16 his authority, express or implied, but shall not include the 
17 state or any political subdivision thereof exeepe-where-ehe-s1!aee 
' 
18 er-any-peli~ieal-sttbdivisiea-~hereef-~hall-ae~ttire-e~-eperaee-a 
19 mass-eraaspe~eaeiea-sys~effl-as-eeiinea-in-sttbseeeieR-{lt➔ -e€-ehis 
20 seeeien; or any carrier by railroad, e~press company, or sleep-
21 ing car company subject to the Federal Railway Labor Act, Title 
22 45 U.S.C.A., or any labor organization or anyone acting in be-
23 half of such organization other than when it or he is·acting as 
24 an employer in fact. 
25 SECTION 3. 89-15-2 (2), Colorado Revised Statutes 19_63, is 
26 amended to read: 
27 89-15-2. Definition of tenns. (2) The word "district" 
28 when not otherwise qualified means a metropolitan sewage disposal 
29 
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l district formed under the provisions of this article or as changed 
2 from time to time. A district formed under this article shall 
3 ~ee be considered a political subdivision for the purposes of 
4 section 89-S-a-~a➔ 80-4-2 (2), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
5 AS AMENDED. 
6 SECTION 4. Reoeal. 80-4-2 (16) and (17), 80-4-3 (4), 
7 80-4-9, 80-4-10 (2), and 80-4-11 (3), Colorado Revised Statutes 
8 1963 (1965 Supp.), are repealed. 
9 SECTION 5. Effective date. This act shall take effect 
10 January 1, 1970 •. 
11 SECTION 6. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby 
12 finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for 


















BACKGROUND REPORT ON 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATIONS 
. _The first question to b: considered is whether legislation 
providing a framework for public employee negotiations for the 
state and its political subdivisions is necessary. The answers 
to this question are likely to vary, depending upon the situa-
tion of the persons of whom the question is asked. It was stated 
at the annual meeting of the Education Commission of the States, 
as an example, that there are persons already involved in the 
bargaining process in states in which there are no laws on public 
employee negotiations. These persons may say: "We would be 
more fearful of the enactment of a law than the lack of it be-
cause we are now in a position where we think we are operating 
effectively without a law." Legislators simply impose limita-
tions which do not now exist. Thus these persons would conclude 
that they can fare better in negotiations without legislation 
than they could fare with legislation. 
Continuing the example, it was pointed out that other 
persons in the same state who would be denied the ability to 
participate in the process of negotiations with their public em-
ployer because the employer would say: "There are no legal 
guidelines; consequently, I am not going to be involved because 
I do not have to."]/ 
There are, of course, many other ramifications involved 
in the question of whether state legislation relating to public 
employee negotiations should be enacted. The point is that it 
is difficult to make many general statementsp applicable to all 
public employees and their employers, on the effects of state 
legislation on this subject. 
Part of the difficulty in attempting to evaluate whether 
legislation is necessary stems from the diversity of public 
employment situations in a state such as Colorado. Some school 
districts, large cities, and the state government employ thous-
ands of persons; other units of government employ few persons 
each of whom is well-known to the public employer. Some of the 
governmental units have civil service systems which would have 
an effect on the negotiation process. 
As would be expected, a variety exists in the methods of 
determining wages pf public employees in Colorado. The Denver 
17 Statement of Prof. J.P. Linn, University of Denver School 
of Law taken from Compact, the publication of the Education 
Commission of the States. 
city charter requires that police and fire department salaries 
be set by vote of the people of the city~ State civil service 
and local caree? service boards are involved in making wage sur-
veys which have a major part in determining salary adjustments 
for public employees. Teachers in Denver may be said to bargain 
collectively through an exclusive bargaining agent with the 
school boardc In general, it would be expected that less for-
mal arrangements would be used in the determining of salaries of 
public employees for smaller governmental units. 
What changes might be expected if a bill such as that 
proposed by the committee were to be adopted in Colorado? First, 
Herrick Roth, President of the Colorado Labor Council (AFL-CIO), 
stated that a law providing for public employee negotiation pro-
ced11res would encourage public employees to organize in order to 
bargaln collectively .. This result is borne out in the experi-
ence of other states. Another probable result of legislation 
w2s pointed out by Ted Tedesco, Boulder City Manager, who sug-
gested th~t statutory procedures for negotiations would tend to 
place the relationshi.p bet,~,een the public employers and the em-
ployees on more form2l, less personal 1 basiso Mr. Tedesco said 
he did not know whether a change to more formal work relation-
ships would be detrimental or beneficial, but that such a change 
would probably occur .. 
Possibly the most important consideration by the commit-
tee involved whether a statute on public employee negotiations 
would act to Teduce disputes between public employees and their 
employers, or whether such laws might actually encourage dis-
putesn The opinion of most of the conferees appearing before 
the committee was favorable toward legislation. Legislation 
could provide a means of avoiding disputes on the q~estion of 
recognition of an employee organization -- that is, it would 
settle any question of whether employees would have the right 
to organizeo Furtherp legislation would provide a clear means 
of resolving jurisdictional disputes between competing employee 
organizations regarding the exclusive bargaining agent for the 
employees. These guidelines for employee organizations may be 
viewed as helpful to both the employees and employers in pro-
viding answers to questions that arise when public employees 
organize and ask to be recognized as a collective bargaining 
agent. 
It should be noted that some of the committee members 
argued that legislation was unnecessary in Colorado, partly be-
cause the present informal procedures established between the 
public employer and the employees have worked satisfactorily in 
the past and can continue to make satisfactory adjustments in 
the future" Most public employers are interested in hearing 
from their employees in regard to all aspects of their employ-
ment, and it would be unnecessary to establish formal procedures 
for this process~ Additional arguments against legislation 
were discussed by the committee and are outlined in the commit-
tee report contained in this publication~ 
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The remainder of this background report will review exist-
ing Colorado legislation relating to public employee negotia-
tions; outline the approach of the federal government in this 
area; list statutes of other states and discuss the experience 
under two state statutes; and summarize the recommendations sub-
mitted to the committee in hearings held this summer. 
Existing Colorado Legislation 
Colorado has not enacted specific legislation regarding 
either the rights of public employees to organize or to prohibit 
their organizing for the purpose of conducting negotiations with 
their employers~ However, general legislation in the statutes 
pertaining to the industrial commission may apply to public em-
ployee negotiations (sections 80-1-30 through 80-1-33, C.R.S. 
1963). These sections forbid employees, perhaps including public 
employees, the right to strike until the industrial commission 
has held hearings on the dispute, if the courts rule that a 
strike would not be in the best interest of the public. However, 
action taken by the court is only temporary and allows an indefi-
nite "cooling off period" before a strike could go into effect. 
The term "employer" as used in article 1 of chapter 80 includes 
"the state, and each county, city, town, irrigation and school 
district therein .... having four or more employees." (80-1-3 (4) 
(a), C.R.S. 1963). 
Under section 80-4-2 (2), C.R.S. 1963, the state and po-
litical subdivisions are not considered to be employers and are 
exempt from the provisions of the "Labor Peace Act''. The Labor 
Peace Act sets standards for: (1) employee-employer relations; 
(2) prevents unfair labor practices, as defined; and (3) estab-
lishes procedures for arbitration and mediation of labor dis-
putes. 
Several attempts have been made in the General Assembly 
to remove the exempt status of the state and its political subdi-
visions from the Labor Peace Act. If the exemption for the state 
and its political subdivisions were removed, these governmental 
units would become as any other employer and all provisions of 
the act would apply to the state and its political subdivisions. 
The only areas in which the Labor Peace Act applies to public 
employees is for employees of metropolitan sewage disposal dis-
tricts (89-15-2 (2) 0 CGR.S. 1963) and to employees of any publi-
cally owned and operated mass transportation system in the state 
(80-4-2, C.R.S. 1963, 1965 Supp.). 
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The Federal Approach to Public 
Employee Negotiations 
On January 17, 1962, President Kennedy signed Executive 
Order 10988 -- Employee-management Cooperation in the Federal 
Service. Executive Order 10988 created, for the first time, a 
government policy of "affirmative-willingness" to enter agree-
ments with employee organizations . ..?/ 
Forms of Recognition. The Executive Order provides for 
three types of employee recognition -- informal, formal, and ex-
clusive. To be accorded any type of recognition, an employee 
organization must not: (1) assert the right to strike against 
the government; (2) advocate the overthrow of our constitutional 
form of government; (3) discriminate with regard to membership 
because of race, color, creed, or national origin; or (4) be 
subject to corrupt influences. 
According to the study preceding this Executive Order, it 
was discovered that in many departments of the federal govern-
ment there were successful employee organizations already in ex-
istence. To prevent the decline of the successful organizations, 
it was recommended that these groups be given at least informal 
recognition. However, the article cited concluded that the heart 
of Executive Order 10988 is exclusive recognition of an employee 
organization. To be given exclusive recognition, an employee 
organization must meet all requirements listed above, and also 
have the majority of a department's employees in their organiza-
tion. Once a department's organization is given exclusive recog-
nition, the department's other employee organizations can only 
be represented informally. 
Sovereign Immunity. One of the chief objections to the 
federal government entering into binding agreements with labor 
organizations has been that, under United States tradition, 
sovereign government's powers cannot be subject to bargaining by 
an administrator without Congress waiving the government's im-
munity to be sued. Executive Order 10988 was said to avoid the 
problem of sovereign immunity by omitting any provision binding 
agencies to agreements negotiated with employee organizations 
(Section 7 (lJ). 
Information for this discussion is taken from an article by 
Robert Jacoby, "Collective Bargaining Rights for Federal Em-
ployees", New York University Intramural Law Review, Vol. 18, 
May 1963, pp. 287-310. 
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Substitutions for the Right to Strike. Even though a 
government employee organization cannot strike, several other 
alternatives were mentioned in the article cited as available to 
an organization in meeting its objectives: 
(1) The fact that Executive Order 10988 was issued 
indicated some expectation that there would be 
agreements between management and employees. 
(2) Government employees' organizations carry on 
extensive lobbying activities in Congress 
which could result in pressure on management. 
(3) Management officials' careers depend upon fav-
orable publicity, and labor organizations have 
maintained a good rapport with the press. 
Employee organizations were said to have the 
power to make management appear in an unfav-
orable light~ 
(4) Government employees' organizations can pick-
et during off-duty hours. 
(5) Negotiation impasses may also be resolved 
through the use of such techniques as media-
tion and fact finding. 
Subjects of Negotiations. Since hour and wage laws are 
determined by the Classification Act System, it may appear that 
there is very little left for employee organizations to negoti-
ate. However, a list of some areas where negotiations can take 
place would include: boost in civil service grading; working 
conditions; grievance procedures; work shifts; promotion stand-
ards; disciplinary practices; and employee services. 
Arbitration. Under Executive Order 10988, neither ad-
visory nor compulsory arbitration is available to resolve nego-
tiation impasses. The government felt that arbitration would 
severely hurt the growth of public employee organizations be-
cause arbitration would not allow a pattern of normal collec-
tive bargaining practices to be developed. Bargainers would tend 
to rely on arbitration to settle disputes instead of working for 
a settlement on their own. 
Check-Off Authorization. Executive Order 10988 does not 
provide for withholding organization dues from employees' pay-
checks. The task force working for the President had urged that 
Congress allow withholding of employees' pay to insure the sta-
bility of the employee organizations0 Congress has not permit-
ted check-off authority for dues collections for pubiic employee 
organizations. 
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Laws of Other States 
A total of 24 states have enacted legislation covering at 
least some aspects of public employee negotiations in their 
states. These laws vary considerably in their scope, with some 
states having legislation covering all public employees (e.g., 
New York) and other states having separate legislation for dif-
ferent groups of public employees (e.g., Rhode Island). Listed 
in Table I are the states which have enacted legislation, the 
statutory citations of these acts, and the employee groups af-
fected by the legislation. 
A limited number of copies of these state laws are avail-
able to members of the General Assembly in the Legislative Coun-
cil Office. Summary tabulations of key aspects of these laws 
are available in several of the publications listed in the select-





State Statutes Concerning Public 
Employee Negotiations 
Act No. 229, 1967 Session Laws, p. 598 (Fire 
Fighters) 
Sections 23.40.010 to 23.40.40 Alaska Statutes 
{Public Employees) 
Sections 3500 to 3509, Government Code, West's 
Annotated California Codes (Public_Employees); 
Sections 1960 to 1963, Labor Code, 1967 Pocket 
Part, West's Annotated California Codes {Fire 
Fighters); and 
Sections 13080 to 13088, Education Code, 1967 
Pocket Part, West's Annotated California Codes 
(Teachers) 
Alabama has enacted legislation setting forth a "Policy on 
Public Employment" which prohibits state employees from es-
tablishing labor unions or labor organizations (Title 55, 
Section 317, as amended, Code of Alabama). Exempted from 
this policy are teachers, dock employees, and employees of 











Public Act No. 159, Public Acts of Connecticut 
1965, as amended by Public Act 491, Public Acts 
of Connecticut 1967 (Municipal Employees); and 
Public Act 298, Public Acts of Connecticut 1965 
(Teachers) 
Title 19, Sections 1301 to 1313, Delaware Code 
Annotated, 1966 Pocket Part (Public Employees) 
Ch. 67-900, General Laws of Florida 1967, p. 524 
(Fire Fighters) 
Ch. 111 2/3, Sections 301 to 304; 328a, Smith-
Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes (Metropolitan 
Transit Authority) 
Ch. 8, Part V -- Title 23, Section 890, Louisi-
ana Revised Statutes, 1966 Pocket Part (Public 
Transportation Facilities) 
Ch. 396, Public Laws of Maine 1965, p. 511 (Fire 
Fighters) 
Art. 64b, Sections 1 to 4; 7 (s), Annotated Code 
of Maryland, 1968 Replacement Volume (Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority) 
Massachusetts -- Ch. 161a, Section 19, Massachusetts General Laws 




Ch. 763, Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts 
1965, p. 555 (Municipal Employees); and 
Chapter 149, Sections 178b to 178n, Massachu-
setts General Laws Annotated, 1968 Pocket Part 
(State and Municipal Employees) 
Section 17.455 {l) to 17.455 (16), Michigan 
Statutes Annotated, 1968 Supplement (Public 
Employees) 
Section 179.50 to 179.60, Minnesota Statutes 
1965 (Public Employees); and 












Sections 105.500 to 105.530, Revised Statutes 
of Missouri 1959, 1967 Supplement (Public Em-
ployees) 
Chapter 250, Laws of Montana, 1967 Session, p. 
753 (Employees of Health Care Facilities) 
Chapter 518, Nebraska Session Laws of 1967, p. 
1738 (Teachers) 
Chapter 38-A, Sections 38-A:l to 38-A:4 and 
38-A:18, New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotat-
ed, 1967 Supplement, Vol. 1 (Municipal Transit 
Authority) 
Chapter 392, McKinney's Session Law News of New 
York, p. 393 (Public Employees) 
Chapter 720, Session Laws of Oregon 1961, p. 
1477 {Employees of Health Care Facilities); 
Chapter 579, Session Laws of Oregon 1963, p. 
1146, as amended by Chapter 543, Session Laws 
of Oregon 1965, p. 1064 (Public Employees); and 
Chapter 390, Session Laws of Oregon 1965, p. 
795 (Teachers) 
Sections 28-9.1 to 28-9.1-14, General Laws of 
Rhode Island, 1956, 1966 Pocket Supplement 
(Fire Fighters); 
Sections 28-9~2-l to 28-9.2-14, General Laws of 
Rhode Island 1956, 1966 Pocket Supplement 
(Policemen); 
Sections 28-9.3-1 to 28-9.3-16, General Laws of 
Rhode Island 1956, 1966 Pocket Supplement 
(Teachers); 
Sections 28-9.4-1 to 28-9.4-19, General Laws of 
Rhode Island 1956, 1967 Pocket Supplement (Muni-
cipal Employees); and 
Sections 36-11-1 to 36-11-6, General Laws of 









Public Act No. 198, Part III, Acts and Resolves 
of Vermont 1967, p. 355 (Public Employees) 
Sections 28.72.010 to 28.72.090, Revised Code 
of Washington, 1967 Supplement (Teachers); and 
Sections 41.56.010 to 41.56.900, Revised Code 
of Washington, 1967 Supplement (Public Employees) 
Chapter 111.70, Wisconsin Statutes 1965 (Muni-
cipal Employees); and 
Chapter 111.80 to 111.94, Wisconsin Session Laws 
1965-1966. p. 1081 (State Employees) 
Sections 27-265 to 27-273, Wyoming Statutes 
1957, Vol. 7, 1967 Replacement (Fire Fighters) 
Comments About Statutes in Other States 
Possibly the most difficult aspect of a study of public 
employee negotiations is to attempt to analyze whether legisla-
tion in other states has been successful or unsuccessful in 
meeting problems of negotiations and work stoppages by public em-
ployees. The many problems involved in public employee disputes 
are discussed in many sources of information. However, while 
much is reported in regard to the effects of legislation in other 
states, the reporting often is much more subjective than objec-
tive. For this reason it is important to take into consideration 
the background and the position of the individual offering an 
opinion relating to a particular dispute or the effectiveness of 
a state statute under discussion. 
The experience with the laws of two states -- New York and 
Wisconsin -- were discussed at some length at the 1968 annual 
meeting of the Education Commission of the States held in Denver. 
It was thought that some of the comments expressed at this meet-
ing regarding these statutes, in particular, would be of inter-
est to members of the General Assembly. The discussions were 
based on the experience in these states prior to July, 1968, so 
the remarks may or may not be applicable to the 1968 New York 




The "Taylor Act" in the State of New York has been the 
subject of considerable discussion because of a series of lengthy 
strikes by public employees in New York City. The question which 
appears to attract the most attention in regard to this statute 
is whether the blanket prohibition against all strikes and the 
severe penalties against strikes actually serve as a deterrent 
of public employee strikes in New York. · 
Speaking in a panel discussion at the annual meeting of 
the Education Commission of the States, Dr. Herbert Johnson, As-
sociate Commissioner for Education Finance and Management in the 
New York State Education Department, defended the New York law 
on the basis of the number of agreements reached between school 
districts and their employees~ First, it was reported by Dr. 
Johnson that, of the 800-plus school districts in the state, ap-
proximately 700 written contracts were negotiated between the 
employers and the employees in 19670 Dr. Johnson stated: 
There have been problems about it, of cour~e. 
The parties haven't always agreede They have 
reached some impasses; in about 270 of these cases 
they have ~esorted to the mediation which is pro-
vided under th~ law when impasses occur. Out of 
the 270 mediation cases, some 180 went to the next 
step, which is fact-finding, and in about 40 of 
the cases out of the 180 the fact-finders' recom-
mendations were rejected either by the employer or 
the employee. But the interesting thing is that 
out of all of these situations, there were only 
two strikes which occurred -- I have ruled out now 
New York City -- one lasted two days and the other 
lasted slightly over a week. These two, in our 
view, were caused by rather special circumstances 
which we won't go into here. 
But the point is that the law (1) removes the 
first problem, namely, can there be negotiations? 
This is the first cause of unrest and unhappiness 
among employees. It guarantees that they organ-
ize and negotiate. (2) It does provide for medi-
ation and fact-finding in cases where impasses 
occur, and this has been remarkably successful.y 
Compact. Vol. 4. No. 2, Denver: 
the States, August, 1968. p. 28. 
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Education Commission of 
Later in the discussionD Dr; Johnson stated that the 
Condon-Waldin Act, which preceded the Taylor Act, uwas ·generally 
regarded as unworkable" because the penalties were so severe 
they were never invokedo The Taylor Act has the same prohibi-
tion against strikes, but it provides an "entirely different kind 
of machinery." Dr. Johnson continued: 
First of all, it provides a sensible step-by-
step procedure to try to get agreement before the 
thing reaches that extremity. But if by chance it 
does, there are some penalties which are then di-
rected not against the individual but against the 
organization and the officers of that organization 
and which vary in degree of severity. Most people 
would, I think, feel that the severity is not so 
great that it is an absolute bar. In a sense what 
you have done is to discourage strikes very strong-
ly, and you say you prohibit them, but of course we 
know that some do occurff It seems to·me for our 
present purposes it is about the right position for 
us to be in in the State of New York . .2/ 
In addition to the argument that the act has worked well 
on an over-all basis, proponents of the act also state that in 
major disputes resulting in strikes by public employees in New 
York City, including the 1967 teachers strike and the 1968 sani-
tation strike, the procedures provided by the law were not fully 
used. Proponents contend. therefore, that 11 ••• it is much too 
early to conclude that the philosophy of the Taylor Law is er-
roneous or that its procedures will not fulfill its objectives." fv 
Others have argued against the provisions of the Taylor 
Law. The noted mediator of labor disputes, Theodore W. Kheel 
was quoted as stating that "the Taylor Law does not work effec-
tively because it purports to provide joint determination when 
in fact it continues the unilaterial determination." Mr. Kheel 
has recommended that public employees be allowed to strike, but 
that "techniques for resolving impasses similar to those in 
Taft-Hartley for the resolution of emergency disputes" be uti-
lized.'1/ 
J.I 
Ibid., p. 30 .. 
1968 Supplement to Report of Task Force .Qn State and Local 
Government Labor Relations, National Governors' Conference. 
Chicago: Public Personnel Association. p. 7. 
Ibid .. , p. 2. (Quotation from report by Mr. Kheel to Speaker 
of New York House of Representatives, February, 1968). 
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The contention was made that cumbersome and inflexible 
impasse proceedings tend to become impediments to negotiated 
settlements of disputes. The prohibition against strikes was 
said to remove the force that produces voluntary settlements and 
genuine joint determination of conditions of employment. Mr. 
Kheel noted that major strikes have occurred despite the strike 
prohibition and the penalties for strikes.§/ 
Wisconsin 
Professor Nathan P. Feinsinger of the University of Wis-
consin School of Law has been an advisor to both the governor 
and attorney general of Wisconsin and has had long experience in 
the settlement of labor disputes. In a panel discussion at the 
1968 annual meeting of the Education Commission of the States, 
Professor Feinsinger summarized the experience under the Wiscon-
sin statute: 
We have had, I think,a very good experience 
under the statute in Wisconsin, not only in con-
nection with school teachers' problems but with 
everybody's. First, we have what we call a fact-
finding procedure; usually we get the settlement 
first, and then we pass the terms of the settle-
ment in the shape of facts. What are facts? 
Facts are what you want to be facts. 
Secondly, where it is a first contract, we 
usually wait to announce the settlement until the 
contract language has been drafted because there 
are many problems that arise in transmitting into 
contract language what you think you have agreed 
to. Especially if it is a first contract where 
tempers are likely to run high before you break up 
the proceeding, be sure that you have what you 
agreed to in contract language. 
Thirdly, we have now on the back burner a 
voluntary no-strike agreement in two cases, one 
involving the police and another involving the 
deputy sheriffs. We had no trouble getting those 
agreements because, as the unions told me, "Look, 
we can't strike anyhow, we know that, not the po-
liceo"9/ 
.§I lb id . , p. 7 • 
y Compact, Q.P.. cit. p. 27. 
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In a speech delivered to the same meeting, Professor 
Feinsinger considered the question of what is the best way to 
improve the Wisconsin law. Professor Feinsinger said that he 
would assume that all strikes are illegal; but that specific 
sanctions would be provided only in cases where the public inter-
est is really involved. In these cases, it would be desirable 
to set up machinery to be sure that there is immediate action. 
A 30-day or 60-day temporary restraining order could be obtained 
from the courts, during which time "heavy mediation" could take 
place • ..!.Q/ 
Speaking more generally in regard to legislation prohibit-
ing public employee strikes, Professor Feinsinger proposed use of 
voluntary no-strike agreements involving a pledge given in good 
faith by the union or employee organization: 
Next, I say "Never expose the impotence of a 
democracy .. " If you say to the American working 
man or woman, "You are not going to strike," they 
will find a thousand ways to beat you. If you can 
get a voluntary agreement from the workers, that 
is quite different, not only because it exposes 
the strikers or the wildcatters to a lawsuit, but 
also because a strike would violate a pledge given 
in good faith by the union. By and large, the 
unions will live up to their pledge, and will take 
care of the wildcatter and do all possible to pre-
vent it from happening again. .. 
How do you get such a voluntary agreement? 
There are two ways, I think. One is by sticking 
it into the contract whereby it becomes legally 
enforceable by injunction or venue. I don't think 
that is the best way. 
There ls another way and this is novel. If a 
union is reluctant to give its pledge to th~ em-
ployer, to the city for example, that it will not 
strike because of the risk of a lawsuit, it should, 
in my judgment, give a pledge to the general public 
that it will not strike for the duration of the 
agreement. 
Some may say that's a lot of nonsence, that's 
not even a slap on the wrist. In my opinion it is 
possible to get \Such an agreement, an agreement not 
.!Q/ Compact, Q.Q. cit. pp. 22-23. 
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enforceable by the employer; not enforceable by any-
body in the courts. or by compulsion of any kind, 
but resting entirely on the good faith of the people 
who give that pledge. I think in the world of today 
that kind of pledge is much more important than one 
which is legally enforceablea 
As far as I know, this is the first time that 
this concept has been advanced • .!!/ 
ll/ Compact, .9.2 • ..£.ti.. p. 23. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS ·suBMITTED 
TO THE COMMITTEE 
I. Should Legislation be Enacted? 
The majority of persons appearing before the committee 
either stated or implied that state legislation concerning pub-
lic employee negotiations should be enacted by the Colorado Gen-
eral Assembly. The differences occurred in regard to how speci-
fic any legislation should be and, of course, the content of any 
legislation. Mr. Newman (CEA) expressed the following view to-
ward this question: 
If effective channels for peaceful negotia-
tions are to be maintained, the process must be 
clearly set in the context of statutory provision 
o••· We believe it is the course of wisdom to 
establish such a framework for resolving such dis-
putes ... e f_wJe believe it is the most rational 
of processes for these differences to be resolved 
across the bargaining table in an atmosphere of 
sincere give-and-take where professional interests 
are not unilaterally determined. Without statutory 
guidelines setting forth this process, we believe 
the door is opened wide for raw power plays and 
serious disruptions~ 
In contrast wi.th this view, the members of the Colorado 
Civil Service Commission and its personnel director stated that 
they were not convinced that there is a need for public employee 
negotiation legislation, at least at the state level, since 
negotiations are being conducted now on an informal basis. How-
ever, the Commission did present a bill which they would recom-
mend if the committee concluded that legislation was necessary. 
Representatives of the Colorado Association of School 
Boards and the CEA said that the greatest problem facing profes-
sional negotiations in Colorado is the lack of rules and guide-
lines in handling questions such as recognition of bargaining 
units and the scope of negotiations. A letter from the Colorado 
State Board of Education reported that the board's position was 
that:"there is a great need for a statute which prescribes the 
basic procedures governing the conduct of negotiations." 
Exclusions from a Statute 
Definition of Management. Professor Linn of Denver Uni-
versity suggested that the following persons or groups be ex-
cluded from coverage of the act on the basis of management re-
sponsibilities: 
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, Elec~ed officials, the heads of departments 
ano agenc1esg the members of boards and commis-
sior~s, managerial employees, negotiating repre-
sentatives for employing authorities, the immedi-
ate personal or confidential assistants and aides 
of the foregoing persons and all individuals hav-
ing authority in the interest of the employer to 
exercise in<lependent judgment to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay-off, recall, promote, discharge, as-
signo reward9 or discipline other employees, or 
who have responsibility to direct employees, to ad-
just their grievances, or to effectively recommend 
such action should be excluded from coverage of the 
act. 
Home Rule Cities~ Article XX, Section 6 of the state 
constitution provides. in part, that "the statutes of the state 
of Colorado~ so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to 
such cities and townsp except in so far as superseded by the 
charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursu-
ant to such charters." 
The position taken by the Denver city attorney, as pre-
sented by Mr. McDermott, personnel director for the Denver Ca-
reer Service Authority, was that legislation which would attempt 
to include Denver under a law covering all state and municipal 
employees for collective bargaining purposes would constitute an 
"unlawful and unconstitutional" interference with the powers 
given to Denver to regulate and define the qualifications and 
terms of tenure of its municipal employeese 
Mr. McDermottis conclusion was that: "It would then be 
expected that any proposal in state law concerning state-wide ap-
plication of collective bargaining methods would exempt the City 
and County of Denvern 
Colleges and Universities. Persons meeting with the com-
mittee or otherwise contacted from the University of Colorado, 
Colorado State University, Colorado School of Mines, and Colo-
rado State Colleges expressed preference, on behalf of both fac-
ulty and administration, to be excluded from state legislation 
on the subject of public employee negotiations. In a letter from 
John P. Holloway, Resident Counsel for the University of Colorado 
stated: "We believe that the establishment of such internal 
staff and faculty employer-employee relationships is superior to 
any attempt to establish same on a state-wide basis by general 
legislation." 
The same letter quoted from an official policy statement 
of April 27, 1968, by the American Association of University 
Professors: 
The Association will therefore oppose legisla-
tion imposing upon faculty members in higher educa-
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tion the principle of exclusive representation de-
rived from models of industrial collective bargain-
ing. When legislation of this character exists or 
is proposed, the Association will rather support 
measures that will encourage institutions of higher 
education to establish adequate internal structures 
of faculty participation in the government of the 
institution .. 
The spokesman for Colorado State University said that 
faculty members fear negotiations because they believe it would 
result in the creation of a "step system" for salaries, which 
could result in the University not being able to compete for 
faculty on a nation-wide market. Dean Kuhn of Colorado School 
of Mines said that faculty members want their salaries based on 
their ability, not on broad, negotiated scales, with many other 
types of employees. 
Faculty members in the state college system do not have 
the same type of merit system bargaining procedure as the fac-
ulty at the universities and the School of Mines. Dr. Irvine 
Forkner of Metropolitan State College said that state college 
faculty members would prefer a merit system over collective bar-
gaining negotiations, if a merit system similar to the other 
institutions of higher education could be achieved for them. A 
motion later submitted to the committee by a committee of state 
college faculty representatives favored the exclusion of state 
college faculty from state-wide collective bargaining in order 
that these colleges "may work through their own system-wide per-
sonnel regulations and policies." 
The committee did not hear from college and university 
faculty members who are members of the Colorado Federation of 
Teachers (AFL-CIO). However, Mr. Rapp presented a position pa-· 
per of three university locals, AFT, concerning collective bar-
gaining for public employees, the conclusion of which follows: 
The Colorado Federation of Teachers univer-
sity locals recommend enabling legislation permit-
ting collective bargaining, when requested by 3~ 
of the bargaining unit, for public employees in 
Colorado including the teachers at state-supported 
campuses. An orderly process in law to determine 
the desire to negotiate and the bargaining agent, 
and legislation permitting the writing of con-
tracts with latitude provided both parties in de-
termining the content of contracts would be most 
desirable in Colorado. 
Should Legislation be Separate for Different Groups? 
The positions taken by various groups and individuals 
varied to some extent on this question. For sake of brevity, 
the positions are briefly summarized, rather than quoted in full. 
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Colorado Education Association. The position of the CEA 
was that legislation should be separate, at least for teachers, 
in order to avoid the restrictions of the scope of negotiations 
to "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" 
which might be suitable in other areas of public employment. 
Teachers, however, "will continue to assert their claim of spe-
cial competence to participate in decision-making over educa-
tional programs and services, 0 M-ra Newman said. 
Although a separate act for teachers was favored by the 
CEA, an alternative to creating separate legislation and agency, 
would be the establishment of a Public Employee Relations Board 
with separate divisions such as: (1) police and firemen, (2) 
health and welfare services, (3) transit, (4) education, (5) 
public utilities. The Board would be authorized to promulgate 
rules in respect to the scope of negotiations tailored to fit 
the "realities and traditions" of each category. 
The State Board of Education said that a single statute 
governing all public employees would work, provided that appro-
priate individualized treatment of the unique public school sit-
uation would be insured~ 
Professor Linn(DU) said that separate legislation should 
not be enacted for any special occupational or professional 
group: 
A basic, uniform public policy regarding em-
ployee relations appears preferable. Limited 
special treatment may be justified, e.g., it is 
traditional for those with police authority to be 
required to constitute a separate unit of em-
ployees and be represented by an organization ad-
mitting police only to membership. This can be 
provided in a single lawo 
Four reasons were listed for this conclusion: (1) there 
are no significant differences between the conditions and prob-
lems at different governmental levels or among the various units 
of government; (2) there would be greater economy in the admin-
istration of a single act; (3) uniformity of policy is desir-
able; and (4) consistency in interpretation of the law would be 
assured. 
Professor Rentfro (CU) pointed out that in private em-
ployment one statute is flexible and broad enough to cover 
"every shade and description of occupation -- blue collar, tech-
nical, orofessional.~. -- under one NLRB and one administrative 
set up. ·11 A state act can be as flexible, Professor Rentfro 
said. In addition, the statute was recommended to cover all 
governmental bodies -- state government, municipalities, coun-
ties, school districts, and special districts. 
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Civil Service Commission. Mr. Hilty said that the bill 
presented the Commission could apply to all public employees by 
adding further provisions for employees not under the state 
civil service system. 
Labor Organizations. The preference of one bill covering 
all public employees was expressed by representatives of the 
Colorado Labor Council, the Denver Federation of Teachers, and 
the American Federation of state, County, and Municipal Employ-
ees. 
II. Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 
None of the conferees were opposed to inclusion in the law 
the right of public employees to organize and to bargain collec-
tively. As has been pointed out, there are numerous employee 
organizations which presently are engaged in negotiation proceed-
ings with public bodies. However, a number of other issues 
closely related to the right to organize have been mentioned and 
some differences of opinion have been noted between the various 
speakers. It should also be noted that the Civil Service Commis-
sion proposed legislation would provide generally for certain 
rights and then provide that the board or commission administer-
ing the civil service system to establish, by rule, procedures 
for the selection of bargaining representatives and rules for 
the elections. Most of the other suggestions specified these 
procedures in the statute. 
Selection of an Exe u i a . Professor 
Linn (DU suggested that a majority vote in a secret election be 
used to select an exclusive bargaining agent. The AFSCME {AFL-
CIO) bill also used the majority criterion for selection of an 
employee unit representative. 
Recognition Elections. The Denver Federation of Teachers 
was opposed to the use of membership lists to determine the call 
for recognition elections, as had been proposed by the Denver 
Classroom Teachers Association. When 30 percent of the teachers 
in the school request a new election, an election should he held. 
The CSCSEA bill provided that the employee organization 
would have "unchallenged status" until one-third or more of the 
state employees in the classified service petition the state em-
ployees relations board for a new election. A new election would 
be held within 120 days. 
Also under the CSCSEA bill, the employees' choice of or-
ganization would be based on either (a) state-wide election; or 
(b) on evidence of majority representation on the basis of dues 
deduction authorization. Under either method, however, the 
negotiation unit for state employees would be all state employ-
ees in the classified service under the CSCSEA plan. 
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Dues Check-off. Several conferees recommended that dues 
check-off be included in the recommended legislation. Several 
jurisdictions, including Denver, Pueblo, and Boulder city gov-
ernments, and the Denver school Board provide dues check-off at 
the present time. 
A more disputed issue, however, was whether dues check-off 
should be made for public employee organizations, other than 
those certified as the exclusive bargaining agento The CSCSEA 
bill would provide that the organization certified to represent 
state employees would have the exclusive right of payroll deduc-
tion for dues and economic benefits for members. 
The AFSCME bill provided that the public employer shall 
deduct, on written authorization of the employee, "such amount 
as the employee shall designate, the terms and conditions of 
which have been negotiated by the labor organization as recog-
nized by ..• this Act." It was explained that the bill included 
this provision specifically, since some governmental agencies 
may object to check-off and nothing could be done to force an 
agency to permit check-off in the absence of a state law. 
The Denver Classroom Teachers Association suggested the 
following procedures for guaranteeing the right of "exclusive" 
recognition of one organization: 






Set up recognition procedures (election); 
Set up length of recognition (2 or 3 years); 
Spell out "Bar" clause (A procedure for de-
certification of a recognized bargaining 
group and for holding elections to certify a 
new bargaining groupJ; 
Allow for flexibility so that all contracts 
will expire on September l; 
Spell out negotiating unit determination; and 
Allow for an "agency shop;" (All employees 
are subject to paying dues to the shop whether 
or not they belonged to the agency shop.). 
Size of the Bargaining Unit 
State Employees. The Civil Service Commission suggested 
that a single bargaining unit be established for state em~l~yees 
if state legislation is adopt~d . . A large_nu~be7 o~ bargaining 
units were said to be developing in many Jurisdictions, many hav-
ing little relationship to any substantial community of inte7est. 
Negotiations in such a setting could create pure chaos, particu-
larily with an integrated classification and pay plan. 
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In regard to appeals from dismissal and discipline ac-
tions, the Civil Service Commission has constitutional authority, 
and arbitration or ad hoc hearing panels would create problems 
and inconsistencies from agency to agency. 
City Employees. The Boulder city manager pointed out 
that experience has shown that once laws are enacted to permit. 
public employee organizations 0 organizations multiply extremely 
rapidly, and city managers have difficulties in negotiating with 
each organization. Therefore, after a ~ertain number of public 
employee organizations are established, provisions should be made 
to establish a labor council to bargain with the city manager 
for all organizations. 
The Colorado Municipal League statement recommended local 
control over the certification and the number of local bargaining 
units. While legislation could require the local governing body 
to designate at least one bargaining agent 0 it was recommended 
that the statute allow additional exclusive bargaining units to 
be designated by the local governing body, "taking into account 
their community of interest and the employees' ability to be ade-
quately represented by an existing certified bargaining unit." 
Teachers. In the CEA bill the term "negotiating unit" 
would mean teachers organized in either of the following classi-
fications: 
(a) Central office and building administra-
tors, directors, supervisors and coordinators, and 
generally all certified personnel holding super-
visory power over other teachers; or 
(b) Classroom teachers, special teachers, li-
brarians, counselors, psychologists, nurses, social 
workers, and generally all certified personnel who 
hold no supervisory power over other teachers. 
The board of education could recognize, under the CEA 
bill, more than one professional organization that represented 
different negotiating units. Further, a professional organiza-
tion would not be prohibited from representing more than one 
negotiation unit if the units would agree on this arrangement. 
(The bill presented by the CEA would apply only to teachers, not 
to other employees.) 
Mr. Craig, Attorney for the Denver School Board, said 
that legislation should make the elected representatives of em-
ployee groups speak for all employees of that bargaining group, 
i.e., exclusive recognition. The committee was asked to deter-
mine what is a bargaining unit so that, teachers would be in one 
unit and clerical help in another unit, for example. 
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Requirement to Bargain Collectively 
The DCTA recommended that legislation include that good 
faith negotiations between employer and employee organizations 
be mandatory, not just permissive. The AFSCME bill contained a 
similar provision as did the CEA bill, which was limited to or-
ganizations representing the teaching professions. The recom-
mendation of the Colorado Municipal League and the state board of 
education also contained this provision. 
Using a different approach, the bill presented by the 
Civil Service Commission would provide that "public employers 
shall have the right to enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments with labor organizations on matters concerning employment 
relations." 
Who Would Bargain for Management? Mr. Roth, Colorado 
Labor Council, said: "The clear delineation of management's 
bargaining being placed directly in the hands of the school dis-
trict's superintendent and/or staff -- not in the lap of the 
Board of Education itself, which should simply set its management 
guidelines for bargaining -- both procedure and substance." In 
answer to a question, Mr. Roth said school boards would still set 
the policy for their negotiators to follow, but school boards 
themselves should not meet "face to face" with teachers during 
the negotiations. 
Under the AFSCME bill, the chief executive officer of the 
state or political subdivision, whether elected or appointed, or 
his authorized representative, would represent the public em-
ployer in collective bargaining. The CEA bill would require that 
the persons designated as responsible for the negotiations de-
velop jointly and approve written negotiation procedures to be 
used. 
Written Contracts. Many conferees recommended that a re-
quirement of a written contract between the employer and the em-
ployee organization be included in any recommended legislation. 
Length of Contracts. The attorney for the Denver School 
Board mentioned that a reasonable length for a negotiated agree-
ment should be determined by the parties. Mr. Rapp (OFT), how-
ever, recommended that the length of contracts be specified in 
the statute. 
Employee Protection 
Professor Rentfro (CU) said that the right to organize 
and to bargain collectively should be protected by specific pro-
hibitions against interference, restraint, or discrimination. 
Similar language protecting the organization and employees was 
included in the bill submitted by the AFSCME (AFL-CIO). Similar 
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provisions were recommended in the Colorado Municipal League's 
statement. 
Right to Join or Not Join Organization -
Alternative approaches possible in regard to the right to 
join or not join an employee organization are discussed below: 
Closed Shop Contract. A contract requiring an employer 
to hire only union members and to discharge non-union members 
and requiring that emgloyees, as a condition of employment, re-
main union members. lNo conferees suggested this approach.) 
Agency Shop Contract. A contract between a union and an 
employer requires employees to pay an amount approximately equal 
to dues to the union. 
Professor Linn and Mr. Breaugh of the DCTA recommended 
legislation including an agency shop provision. 
Open Shop. A shop in which union and non-union workmen 
are employed indiscriminately. Legislation suggested by the 
Civil Service Commission, by CSCSEA, and by the CEA would pro-
vide for an open shop. The CSCSEA bill would prohibit soliciting 
memberships without prior approval of the appointing authority. 
Suits for Violation 
The AFSCME bill included a provision that suits for vio-
lation of agreements between a public employer and a labor organ-
ization representing public employees may be brought by the par-
ties to such agreement in the Colorado courts. 
III. Scope of Negotiations 
Questions on the scope of negotiations are discussed gen-
erally, in regard to all public employees, then more specifi-
cally in regard to school teachers, state employees, and local 
governmental employees. The recommendations received will be 
discussed by category of employment. 
Public Employees Generally 
Professor Rentfro (CU). 
Constructive employee relations will be bet-
ter developed with a broad definition of the scope 
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of bargaining. It can be kept within reasonable 
bounds by the parties and by the fact that bargain-
ing involves two sides, and this law would not 
require- either to agree to a proposal it feels out-
side the scope. Through the exercise of discretion 
and through experience in negotiations, problems 
can and will be resolved~ 
On the other hand, narrowing the scope by 
statute would invite frustrations and pressures 
that could thwart the development of constructive 
bargaining relationships. It would constitute pre~ 
mature and p1~obably unwise limitations that can 
more wisely be worked out by the parties in the 
give and take of negotiations. 
Colorado Labor Council. At the April 18 meeting, Mr. Roth 
said that public employee legislation should be left as flexible 
as possible, including rules affecting any working.conditions 
such as vacations and leave time. 
Boulder City Manager. Mr. Tedesco commented that most 
state statutes did not enumerate management rights. These 
rights should be carefully defined, including the items that 
are and are not bargainable. Similarily, Mr. Tedesco said that 
other state laws state that working conditions and "other condi-
tions of employment" are subject to negotiation. What are the 
"other conditions of employment," Mr. Tedesco asked. 
School Teachers 
CEA. Better policy decisions are reached when teachers 
participate with school boards in respect to decisions relative 
to educational programs and services, Mr. Newman said. The CEA 
was said to favor the idea of having curriculum part of teacher 
negotiations. The CEA believes that most teaching policies 
should be subject to teacher negotiations. 
OFT. Mr. Rapp noted that school boards can change poli-
cies of the school system unilaterally and stated that teachers 
should have the right to negotiate policy matters.with school 
boards. A general law, without specific provisions regarding 
the scope of negotiations was advocated. 
OCTA. Mr. Breaugh said that the committee should not 
limit, in-any way, what is negotiable. 
Colorado Labor Council. In his statement, Mr. Roth said 
that the scope of "working conditions", open for bargaining should 
be quite broad in the case of teachers "because of the unusual 
necessity of facing up to the educational program, curriculum and 
other instructional phases of education as being more closely re-
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lated to the teaching process than ~ny other group within the 
school community. 0 
Colorado Association of School Boards. Mr. Miles said 
that school boards believe that teachers can make suggestions 
concerning the curriculum, textbooks, and other matters of 
school administration~but that boards object to making these mat-
ters subject to negotiation. 
Denver Public Schools. The Staff Relations Director for 
the Denver Public Schools, speaking in general terms and not for 
the superintendent or the board, noted that school administra-
tors would want to limit the scope of teacher-school board nego-
tiations by excluding the topics of curriculum and the choice of 
textbooks from negotiations. It was also noted that the size of 
classroom units and the board's promotion policies should not be 
subject to negotiation. 
The attorney for the Denver School Board said that if 
pupil placement were made a subject of negotiations, the school 
boards would be delegating some of their constitutional author-. 
i.t y .. 
State Employees 
CSCSE~. In its first statement to the committee, the 
CSCSEA stated that they had been engaged informally for many 
years in most phases of state employee negotiations and that a 
formal negotiation procedure can be placed in the law. 
The draft bill presented by Mr. Reese specified three 
levels of negotiations which pertained to the scope of negotia-
tions within state government: 
(1) Legislative Matters (i.e., salaries): The employee 
organization and the Civil Service Commission would enter into 
formal negotiation on all legislation concerning state employees 
in the classified service. Annual negotiations would begin 120 
days prior to December and would conclude on or before that 
date. Written agreements reached by the Commission and the em-
ployee organization shall be presented to the Governor and the 
General Assembly on or before December 1. 
(2) Civil Service Commission Procedures (i.·e., examina-
tions, classifjcation system, discipline): The employee organi-
zation and the Commission would enter into formal negotiations 
relating to procedures under the authority of the Commission on 
July 1. Written agreement shall be reached on or before Septem-
ber 30 for changes in procedures to be. effective January 1. 
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(3) Grievance Procedure (i~e., transfers, shift assign-
ments, vacation schedules): The standard grievance procedure 
adopted by the State Employees Relations Board (a three-member, 
part-time board) shall apply to all departments with employees 
in the classified service. The grievance procedure shall apply 
to all working conditions of employees with such departments and 
divisions. 
Civil Service Commission. Three categories of non-negoti-
able items were mentioned by Mr. Hilty: 
(1) Statutory and Constitutional Prohibitions: The bar-
gainable areas are to some extent prescribed by, or may not con-
flict with the statutes or the constitution of the state or 
charters or ordinances of cities and counties. Mr. Hilty pointed 
out that existing statutory limitations may be modified in time. 
(2) Management Rights: Management should retain the 
right to determine the services to be rendered, locations of its 
operations, establishment of new units and relocation of old 
units, control and use of equipment, scheduling of operations and 
number of shifts, process techniques, methods to carry on opera-
tions, and introduction of new equipment and methods. 
Management should also retain the right to determine bud-
getary procedures, assignment and transfer of employees, layoff 
of employees because of lack of work or funds, size of the work· 
force, determination of job content, and discipline and discharge 
of employees on a reasonable and just basis. 
(3) Certain Civil Service ~r Merit System Management 
Processes: The constitution should preclude collective bargain-
ing on certain merit problems such as selection, promotion ana 
testing, classification analysis, class evaluation, and disci-
pline and discharge. These processes are the basic tenets upon 
which the Civil Service system is predicated. (Mr. Hilty's 
statement expanded further on the procedures used in the proces-
ses listed, stating that the techniques used are usually not 
compatible with the bargining process.) 
Mr. Hilty provided the following list of activities pro-
vided to the Civil Service Commission under Article XII, Section 
13 of the state constitution which presumably would be considered 
non-negotiable areas in the view of the Commission: 
(1) Appointments and employment in the state 
service. 
(2) Promotions to offices in the state service. 
(3) The conduct of selection tests. 
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(4) The grading and compensating of employees 
according to efficient service. 
(5) The removal or disciplining of employees 
upon charges of misconduct or failure to com-
ply with standards of service. 
(6) The authorization of emergency or temporary 
employment. 
(7) The making of rules governing employee rela-
tions. 
(8) The standardization and classification of 
positions. 
(9) The determination of standards of efficient 
service. 
(10) The determination of salary grades of all po-
sitions in the classified service. 
(11) The certification of payrolls. 
(12) Varied statutory duties such as training co-
ordination, salary surveys, etc. 
Professor Rentfro (CU) .. The relationship between civil 
service and collective bargaining was discussed by Professor 
Rentfro at some length. The experiences of the federal govern-
ment and some cities and states which have a civil service system 
were cited. The conclusion reached by Professor Rentfro was that 
"there will probably be a need for some adaptions and limitations 
of collective bargaining in this area, but the necessary adjust-
ments can be made." An excerpt of a 1967 report of a special com-
mission appointed by the Governor of Illinois was quoted: 
1. The 
wages, hours, 
not extend to 
exami.nations, 
Civil Service 
duty to negotiate should extend to 
and working conditions, but should 
rules and regulations concerning 
assignments and promotions under a 
system. 
Employee organizations should be free· to 
offer suggestions to the Civil Service Commission 
or the Legislature for revision or improvement in 
the rules, and employees should be able to raise 
complaints about their application. 
2. Even though a grievance procedure is pro-
vided by a Civil Service law or regulation, an 
employee organization and an employing agency may 
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negotiate a procedure for'handling grievances aris-
ing under their agreement. Any employee with a 
grievance must designate which of these procedures 
he wishes to follow at the time he presents his 
grievance, but he may not use both. 
Local Government Employe~2 
Mr. Tuffield of the International Association of Fire 
Fighters (AFL-CIO) said fire fighters feel that every rank of 
fire fighters, even the chief administrative officers, are em-
ployees because the higher officers have worked their way through 
the ranks. Fire fighters believe that everything is supject to 
negotiation and that the civil service commission should not be 
the negotiators for management. The police and firemen in sev-
eral cities, by tradition, have asked for salary increases, 
through charter arrangement, from the electorate-
IV. Administration of the Law 
The numerous suggestions received regarding administration 
of the act might be considered as involving two alternatives: 
(1) administration being related to one of the existing state 
agencies; or (2) the creation of a new agency to handle the act~ 
Existing Agency Approach 
Mr. Roth of the Colorado Labor Council suggested that a 
division of the Industrial Commission be given authority as the 
determining agency, and would "savo time, effort, and money." 
This proposal would require special staff relating to public em-
ployment, together with modifications in the filing of strike 
notices, the invigorating or activating of the arbitration provi-
sions of the Labor Peace Act in an effort to make advisory awards 
prior to the effecting of a work stoppage, and the enforcement of 
penalties against unfair labor practice charges. 
Legislation submitted by the Civil Service Commission 
would use the present practices and existing agencies for negoti-
ations at the state and local levels of government. However, in 
the event the employer and employee representatives cannot agree, 
a State Employees Labor Relations Board "may be established and 
may be called upon to aid in arriving at an agreement .••. " The 
board could designate a mediator for the dispute. This board 
could be composed of three members, one from labor, another from 
government management, and a third from the general public. 
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Another feature of the Civil Service Commission bill was 
that the selection and certification of bargaining representa-
tives for classified employees and the rules of procedure in the 
election process would be handled by the existing board or com-
mission administering a civil service system. The procedures 
would be as follows: 
(1) Any board or commission administering a civil ser-
vice system for public employees would establish, by rule, pro-
cedures for the selection and certification of the collective 
bargaining representative of the classified employees under such 
system. 
(2) The rules shall include, but not be limited to, (a) 
provisions for the designation of the bargaining unit; (b) an 
election process for employee selection of the bargaining repre-
sentative; and {c) the specification of practices which will be 
prohibited as improper influences on that election process. 
(3) Any board or commission which issues rules pursuant 
to this section could obtain court process in enforcement of such 
rules and court process against any practice found to be in vio-
lation of the rules. 
New Agency Approach 
The CSCSEA recommendation was for a three member, part-
time board, paid on a per-diem basis, that would be appointed by 
the governor, confirmed by the Senate, to serve five-year, stag-
gered terms. This board could also handle non-state public em-
ployee disputes. Duties of this board would be: 
a. To certify recognition of employee organ-
izations. 
b. To establish a standard grievance proce-
dure that would apply to departments regarding 
working conditions. 
c. To establish a panel of certified arbitra-
tors for resolving disputes relating to working 
conditions. 
d. Assist in appointment of fact finders on 
impasses between the state employee organization 
and the Civil Service Commission. 
Professor Rentfro recommended the creation of a Public 
Employee Relations Board to administer the statute a~d to pro-
vide qualified mediation and fact finding services to aid in the 
collective bargaining process and the resolution of impasses. 
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This function might be performed by an enlarged or modi-
fied industrial commission, but it would require a separate of-
fice or division expert in this field. Professor Rentfro's 
statement asked: 
What function would such a Board perform? 
Among others it would: 
a. Determine appropriate bargaining 
units based upon an identifiable comm~nity 
of interest among the employees involved. 
bo Conduct secret ballot elections to 
determine the majority wishes of employees. 
c. Certify exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives based on election results. 
d. Hear and determine unfair labor 
practice charges filed against employing 
agencies or employee organizations. 
e. Appoint mediators or fact finders 
as required by the parties and the necessi-
ties that may arise. 
Professor Linn stated that: 
Experience at both the federal and state 
levels indicate the need for agency service 
in determining the exclusive representative ot 
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and 
in administering the act. This work can be as-
sumed by one or more existing agencies -0r a new 
agency can be created. A separate Public Employ-
ees Relation Board, free from established atti-
tudes and interests respecting employment rela-
tions, would seem desirable~ 
The CEA bill would create an Educational Negotiation Com-
mission, consisting of three members with experience and back-
ground in public educational programs and activities, to b.e 
appointed by the governor to serve five-year staggered terms. 
The commission would have customary powers such as the holding 
of hearings and making rules. The operation of this proposed 
commission is described in the following section relating to the 
administration of the lawe Briefly, however, the commission 
would assist in the settlement of school disputes with the fol-
lowing responsibilities: 
(1) Appoint a mediator if agreement is not reached be-
tween the parties within 150 days before the submission ,date of 
the next budget. 
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(2) If settlement is sti11·not reached, either party to 
the disputes may cause an ad hoc board of arbitrators to be con-
vened. The commission may be requested to appoint a chairman of 
this board, or it would appoint the entire board if one side of 
the dispute failed to name a member to the board. 
Mr. Breaugh suggested the creation of a state-supported 
Public Employee's Mediation Board that would: 
A. Provide mediation and arbitration service; 
B. Hear and rule on unfair labor charges and 
other disputes; and 
C. Have the power to enforce the law -- both with 
employer and employee organizations. 
Other Comments Concerning Administration of the Act 
The State Board of Education told the committee that the 
commission administering the act, whether it is a new or an ex-
isting agency, "should be appropriately constituted to ensure 
familiarity with and expertise in the special problems related 
to the public school employees." However, the board stated that 
it did not.want to become involved in jurisdictional or punitive 
actions. 
Colorado Municipal League. The executive committee of the 
Colorado Municipal League affirmed the statement submitted by the 
League staff to the effect that the state should not be concerned 
with administration of an act on the local level: 
Elaborate and complicated state administration 
should be avoided. Municipal officials are con-
cerned about preserving a proper balance between 
state and local relationships in the area of public 
employer-employee relations. In line with our pre-
vious comment, we do not favor initial establishment 
of state administrative machinery to supervise and 
enforce the bargaining process between local units 
of government and their employees. 
More specifically, in regard to state versus-local admin-
istration, the League statement held that local governing bodies 
should be allowed to certify and determine the number of local 
bargaining agents for negotiation purposes, although a statute 
could set some guidelines for the local governing body. Further, 
the League~ statement suggested that ~ormal resolution of griev-
ances and negotiation disputes not be spelled out in the statute 
or be enforced at the state level. Grievances and negotiation 
disputes should be left to local bargaining determination. 
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V. Resolution of.Disputes 
Alternatives suggested for the r~solution of disputes in-
clude: (1) use of binding arbitration; (2) use of mediation 
service; (3) th-e establishment of procedures for fact finding . 
. with recommendations; and (4) inclusion of each of these tech-
niques for at least some points of the disputesfi 
Opposition to binding arbitration came from several 
sources. As noted under the section concerning the right to 
strike, representatives from organized labor were opposed to this 
approach. Mr. Bailey (Denver Public Schools), Mra Wright (Auro-
ra city manager), and Mr. Tedesco (Boulder city manager) said 
that binding arbitration should not be provided or should be lim-
ited since it would have the effect of delegating a policy matter 
that is the responsibility of the elected school board or city 
council. Mr. Tedesco said that mandatory compulsory arbitration 
should be limited. A city manager cannot commit the city council 
to a budget, for example. At the same time there must be a di-
vision point of responsibility to prevent public employee organ-
izations from going directly to the city council on all matters. 
Professor Linn suggested use of mediation and fact findin~ 
with recommendations, in the resolution of interest disputes 
arising out of demands for new contract termso Binding arbitra-
tion was suggested in the resolution of rights disputes stemming 
from the interpretation or application of a negotiated agreement. 
Compulsory arbitration of interests disputes may become an es-
sential provision of the law in the absence of the right to 
strike, Professor Linn added. 
Use of fact finding was suggested by the CSCSEA in regard 
to issues concerning salaries and civil service procedures, while 
disputes relating to grievances would be handled by arbitrators. 
The statement of CSCSEA is as follows: 
1~ In relation to matters at issue under VI-
1, £economic issues for civil service employee.§?, 
the State Employees Relations Board is empowered 
to appoint a fact finder at the request of either 
party or both. The fact finder to be mutually ac-
ceptable to both parties. The fact finder is em-
powered to make recommendations to the Governor and 
the General Assembly for resolution of the issue or 
issues. The cost of fact finding shall be borne 
equally by the parties, except that if the State 
Employees Relations Board determines either party 
has breached its duty to negotiate in good faith, 
that party shall pay the full c9st of fact finding. 
2. In relation to matters at issue •. ~fcon-
cerning civil service procedurey, the State Em-
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ployee Relations Board is empowered to appoint a 
fact finder if both parties agreed that an im-
passe had developed. 
Upon the results of fact finding, the State 
Employee Relations Board shall require that both 
parties agree in writing to the findings which 
the State Employee Relations Board determines to 
be acceptable to both parties consistent with the 
public interest. 
3. In relation to the standard grievance 
procedure involving matters at issue with depart-
ments and divisions relating to working conditions, 
the employee organization and the appointing au-
thority of such department shall select a mutually 
acceptable arbitrator from a panel of certified 
arbitrators provided by the State Employee Rela-
tions Board. The decision of the certified arbi-
trator shall be final. 
Proposals submitted by the Denver Classroom Teachers As-
sociation (Mr. Breaugh) would: 
1. Provide for binding arbitration in griev-
ances. 
2. Provide for mediation and fact finding in 
negotiations. Make it possible for mutually-
agreed-upon, binding arbitration in negotiation 
(see note 4 below). 
3. Provide teachers with the right to strike. 
Don't try punitive anti-strike legislation -- that 
won't work. However, put in three (3) other pro-
visions: 
A. Compel the use of mediation and 
fact finding before an employee organiza-
tion can strike. 
B. No employer can request a court in-
junction to prevent or end a strike unless 
they have exhausted all means and made every. 
effort at good-faith negotiations. (Mr. 
Breaugh explained that limitations on in-
junctive relief should only be in effect dur-
ing the period of contract negotiations, and 
that employers could seek injunctive relief 
if employees broke their contract.) 
C. No court injunction to prevent or 
stop a strike may be issued unless the strike 
definitely endangers the public safety. 
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4& Provide for a strike limitation. 
A~ Limit the length of a strike to three 
weeks (15 working days)o 
B. If agreement has not been reached by 
this time, then make binding arbitration com-
pulsory on both sldes~ The strikers, of 
courseg return to work during the arbitration 
ses~ions .. 
Co If, after mediation and fact find-
ing have been used, and agreement has not 
been reached, either party may request com-
pulsory, binding arbitration, and this would 
have the same effect as forcing binding ar-
bitration on the other party. 
Compulsory binding arbitration was said to involve a con-
troversy since neither teachers nor school boards are willing to 
accept compulsory binding arbitration. Mr. Breaugh felt that the 
power of binding arbitration would serve as a check on both man-
agement and labor and that a tough policy on either side would be 
preventedo 
Compulsory advisory arbitration was suggested by the CEA, 
with a mediation stage preceding the establishment of an arbi-
tration panel. The CEA bill provided that if a board of educa-
tion and professional organization fail tD agree on terms and con-
ditions of a contract by 150 days prior to the district's budget 
submission date, the Education Negotiations Commission would be 
called to appoint a mediator for the dispute. The commission 
would maintain a list of at least ten disinterested persons with 
experience in dealing with problems of public education who are 
willing to serve as mediators. 
If a settlement is not reached by the mediator within 15 
days, or if the parties do not agree on the appointment· of a 
mediator, either party may, by written notification to the other, 
cause an ad hoc board of arbitrators to be convened. Under this 
procedure, each party would name one member to the board, and 
these two persons would select a third person to serve as chair-
man. If these two persons are unable to agree on a chairman, the 
Education Negotiations Commission would designate a chairman. 
The board of arbitrators would have the power to make findings of 
fact and recommendations for settlement. · 
The bill provided that the findings and recommendations of 
the board of arbitrators would be advisory only and would not be 
binding on either side until adopted by the board of education 
and ratified by majority vote of each negotiating unit involved 
in the dispute. 
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The CEA bill also contained provisions relative to shar-
ing of costs and expenses of mediation and arbitration and for 
paying the cost of election and certification of the negotiating 
agents. 
VI. Right to Strike 
Views presented to the committee may be placed in three 
general categories: 
(1) Inclusion of prohibition of public em-
ployee strikes, at least for certain employees; 
(2) Placing a limitation on the duration of 
public employee strikes; and 
(3) Do not include the issue of strikes in 
legislation. Do not attempt to prohibit strikes 
or to grant the right to strike, but concentrate 
on the achievement of good bargaining procedures. 
The use of provisions similar to the Taft-Hartley 
injunctions and cooling-off period was suggested. 
Perhaps related to this alternative was the posi-
tion that the right to strike should not be limited 
and binding arbitration should not be used. 
The first CSCSEA statement to the committee said that it 
was " ••. their strong conviction that the wholesale transfer of 
industrial-style collective bargaining -- with the right to 
strike as the enforcement weapon -- is neither workable nor de-
sirable from the standpoint of the government, the employees 
working for that government or for the great public interest." 
The CSCSEA pointed out, however, that legislation that prohibits 
the right to strike does not prevent strikes. 
Prohibitions of Strikes. The Civil Service Commission 
bill would provide that no public employee could strike whose jobs 
affect public health, safety, or welfare, or recognize a picket 
line of a labor organization while in the performance of his of-
ficial duties. 
Another method of prohibiting strikes, at least in certain 
areas of governmental services, was outlined in the statement of 
the Colorado Municipal League. Consistent with the other sug-
gestions in the League statement, local control would be retained 
in regard to determination of what are "essential and vital areas 
of service" in which strikes would be prohibited. The statement 
follows: 
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The 1947 Labor Peace Act should be amended to 
protect the public from strikes by public employ-
ees engaged in essential and vital areas of ser-
vice. What is meant by "essential and vital areas 
of service" will vary from unit to unit in various 
areas of the state and should be left by statute 
for determination by the appropriate local govern-
ing body subject only to judicial review. This 
allows maximum bargaining potential between public 
employers and employees in acquiring additional ex-
perience and innovation in the public employee 
labor relations field. 
Limit the Duration of Strikes. An example of the second 
approach of a limited right to strike is from the statement of 
Mr. Breaugh (OCTA) to provide a three week limitation on the 
length of a strike:* 
A. Limit the length of a strike to three weeks 
(15 working days}. 
B. If agreement has not been reached by this 
time, then make binding arbitration compulsory on 
both sides. The strikers, of course, return to 
work during the arbitration sessions. 
C. If, after mediation and fact-finding have 
been used, and agreement has not been reached, 
either party ~ay request compulsory, binding arbi-
tration, and this would have the same effect as 
forcing binding arbitration on the other party. 
The attorney for the Denver School Board, Ben Craig, sug-
gested that there should be more civilized means of settling labor 
disputes other than the use of force. If strikes are permitted 
teacher strikes should be limited to periods when a contract is 
not in effect. Mr. Craig also stated that, if strikes are pro-
hibited, legislation must provide other effective alternatives 
to the strike. 
Since some penalties might be added to a statute if limi-
tations were placed on the right to strike, Professor Linn ad-
vised the committee that: 
If strikes are proscribed, enforcement of 
strike prohibitions should be neither repressive 
nor automatic. Vindictive and specific penal-
ties are not effective deterrents to strikes. 
Courts of equity must find basis in fact for ex-
*See also pages 33-34 for related recommendations of Mr. Breaugh 
pertaining to the resolution of disputes. 
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erc1s1ng its discretion to allow injunctive relief. 
Compulsory arbitration of interests disputes .may 
become an essential provision of the law in the 
absence of the right to strike. 
The approach of not including prohibitions against the 
right to strike in legislation, but instead concentrating on the 
collective bargaining procedures was advocated by Professor 
Rentfro, among others. 
Professor Rentfro said that authorities on this subject: 
... have concluded that the better practice is not 
to prohibit all strikes in the public services. 
Rathe~, provide the machinery for protecting the 
public welfare in much the same manner as the 
federal Taft-Hartley law provides for the enjoin-
ing of those strikes which imperil the national 
health or safety. Thus. strikes of this character 
involving police, fire or sanitation workers could 
be enjoined for a cooling off period while negoti-
ations continued. This point of view would then 
have any further impasse resolved by bindino arbi-
tration •.. Those who would outlaw all strikes by 
public employees agree that such an approach is 
wrong and ineffective without further provision for 
alternative procedures for settling honest and 
legitimate issues which might cause a strike. 
Fact-finding with public recommendations is one ap-
proach. Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, has 
pointed out that a sound policy of public employ-
ment relations must assure a reasonable and fair 
procedure -- with independent third party determi-
nation if necessary -- for settling collective 
bargaining disputes. Most authorities agree that 
limitations upon the right to strike in our society 
cannot rightfully or successfully be imposed with-
out finding and implementing a mutually satisfac-
tory alternative .••• 
No Limitations on the Right to Strike -- No Compulsory 
Arbitration. Speakers associated with the AFL-CIO .(Colorado_ 
Labor Council, AFSCME, and the Denver Federation of Teachers} 
were in agreement that the right of public employees to strike 
should not be limited and compulsory arbitration should not be 
used. The suggestion that teacher strikes be limited to 15 
working days was said to be unrealistic. The DFT was opposed to 
any form of binding arbitration. 
Mr. Roth said: 
The right to strike must be preserved. If any 
alternatives are to merit consideration, they will 
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have to be both new and creative and have the ef-
fect of keeping the disputing parties at the bar-
gaining table to solve their own disputes. Any 
substitute that gives either the union .or manage-
ment the opportunity·to avoid the responsibilities 
of collective bargaining cannot be allowed~ This 
is why compulsory arbitration is not an alternative. 
Mr. Ulmer representing the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees stated that a good public em-
ployee negotiation bill will do much to negate the possibility 
of a strike in the public sector. A strike was said to be an 
employee right that cannot be legislated out of existen~e. 
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APPENDIX·A 
CONFEREES MEETING WITij THE COMMITTEE 
Statements Concerning Public Employees in General 
Peter Dye, Assistant Attorney General 
Professor J.P. Linn, University of Denver School of Law 
Commissioner Albert Mangan, Labor Member, Colorado In-
dustrial Commission 
Professor William Rentfro, Center for Labor Education 
and Research, University of Colorado 
Herrick Roth, Colorado Labor Council, AFL-CIO 
Dr. Harry Seligson, Professor of Industrial Relations, 
University of Denver 
Doug Ulmer, American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO 
State Employees 
R. Y. Batterton, Commissioner, Colorado Civil Service 
Commission 
Cy Burris, President, Colorado Civil Service Commission 
w. F. Hilty, Personnel Director, Colorado Civil Service 
Commission 
Harry Reese, Executive Secretary, Colorado State Civil 
Service Employees' Association 
William Welsh, Commissioner, Colorado Civil Service Com-
mission 
Del Wilson, Colorado State Civil Service Employees' Asso-
ciation 
City and County Employees 
·Councilman Edward Burke, Denver City Council 
Colorado Municipal League (prepared statement) 
Ron Cook, Colorado State Association of County Commis-
sioners 
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John Cresswell, City Attorney of Englewood 
Stanley Dial, City Manager of Englewood 
La Mont E. Does, Mayor, City of Lafayette (prepared state-
ment) · 
Austin Gibbons, Police Protective Association, Denver 
C, 
Gordon Hinds, City Attorney of Pueblo 
George Kelly, Administrative Assistant to the Mayor of 
Denver 
F. Arnold McDermott, Personnel Director, City of Denver 
Career Service Authority 
Ted Tedesco, City Manager of Boulder 
Fred Tuffield, Local 858, International Association of 
Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO 
Bob Wright, City Manager of Aurora 
Education -- Primary and Secondary 
James Bailey, Denver Public Schools 
Neal Breaugh, Denver Classroom Teachers Association 
Dr. w. Henry Cone, Education Commission of the States 
Ben Craig, Attorney, Denver School Board 
Colbert Cushing, Colorado Education Association 
Colorado Department of Education (prepared statement) 
Bernard Jacques, Colorado Education Association 
Robert McCall, Education Commission of the States 
Frank Miles, Colorado Association of School Boards 
David McWilliams, Denver Public Schools 
Wendell Newman, Colorado Education Association 
Richard Rapp, Denver Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO 
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Higher Education 
Dr. Irvine Forkner, Professor of Business Administration, 
Metropolitan State College 
John P. Halloway, Resident Counsel, University of Colo-
rado (prepared statement) 
Dr. Truman H. Kuhn, Dean of Faculty, Colorado School of 
Mines 
w. J. McGregor, Personnel Director, Colorado State Uni-
versity 
Professor Courtland Peterson, University of Colorado 
(prepared statement) . · 
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SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
otiations in Public 
ou er: enter or a or niver-
sity of Colorado, 1968. 
The publication was prepared for participants attending the 
public employee negotiations conference at the University 
of Colorado on June 28-29, 1968. Included in the publica-
tion are summaries of recommendations of reports on public 
employee negotiations in Illinois and New Jersey; a brief 
history of public employee negotiations with brief summa-
ries of selected state legislation; and speeches given at 
different conferences pointing out the various views of col-
lective bargaining in public employment. 
Compact. Vol. 2, No. 4, Denver: Education Commission of the 
States, August, 1968. 
This particular issue of Compact is devoted to the annual 
meeting of the Education Commission of the States which was 
devoted to teacher negotiations. Of interest is the text 
of various conferees speeches discussing teacher negotia-
tions, various panel discussions on problems of education 
negotiations, a questionnaire on teacher militancy on page 
55, and suggested model teacher negotiation legislation on 
pages 52-54. 
Goldberg, Joseph P. "Labor-Management Relations Laws in Public 
Service" Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 91, No. 6, Washington 
D.C.: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 
1968, pp. 48-55. 
The article contains a brief description of various govern-
mental approaches to collective bargaining in public ser-
vice. ·In addition, on pages 54 and 55 of the article, there 
is a table of selected state laws. 
Linn, John Phillip and-Nolte, M. Chester. 0 Background Materials 
on Collective Bargaining for Teachers" Denver: Education 
Commission of the States, 1968. 
The materials in this publication were compiled for the an-
nual meeting of the Education Commission of the States. 
The materials are divided into two sections -- "Background 
Materials on Teacher Militancy, Current Status of Legisla-
tion, and Contents of Teacher Negotiation Laws" and "Issues 
Facing Legislators in Dealing with Governmental Employee 
Relations". Of possible interest to members of the General 
Assembly is a compilation of "Basic Questions Faced by Leg-
islators" which begins on page 29. Questions discussed are: 
(ll the problem (p. 31); (2) who shall be covered? (p. 32); 
(3 separate legislation for teachers? (p. 32); and (4) what 
is negotiable? lp. 42). 
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UNIVERSITY OF DENVER U,W [ i 13-RAR';' 
"Opinions of State Labor Officials·Relating to Adjustment of Pub-
lic Employee Disputes"· Sacramento: Department of Indus-
trial Relations, Division of Labor Statistics and Research, 
State of California, 1968. 
The pamphlet contains replies to a questionnaire ·sent to 30 
states, Colorado is not included, concerning public employee 
negotiations. In -th.e questionnaire, questions were asked on 
subjects such as: (1) ban on strikes; (2) penalti~s for en-
gaging in strikes; (3) opinions on adjusting public employee 
disputes; and (4) any additional comments. '.In addition to 
the results of the questionnaire, two tables are included 
which summarize the state laws of the 30 s~l.ected states. 
Re ort and Recommendations June 1968 -- G vernor' ·s Commission to 
Revise t e Public Em o e Law ·of ·enns vania arrisburg :. 
Department of Labor and Industry, ommonwea th of Pennsyl-
vania, 1968. · · 
The report contains a brief summary· of the commission's rec-
ommendations and an explanation of the commit~ee's recommen-
dations. 
Re ort on Collective Bar 
Maine: eg s ative 
1968. 
The report contains a brief committee report concernin~ 
collective bargaining in municipalities, and a copy of the 
proposed legislation granting negotiations to municipali-
ties. 
Schmidt, Charles T. Jr. "Representation of Classroom Teachers" 
Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 91, No. 7, July 1968, pp. 27-
36. 
The article presents two case studies of the selection of 
bargaining representatives in Michigan. On page 36 of the 
article there is a brief summary of the case studies which 
show the education association's evaluation towards collec-
tive bargaining as indicated by the success of the Grand 
Rapids Education Association defeating the Grand Rapids 
Federation of Teachers in an exclusive representation elec-
tion, whereas in the cas~ of Detroit the Detroit Education 
Association was unable to become the exclusive bargaining 
agent a few years earlier. 
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